The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression by Klonick, Kate
St. John's University School of Law 
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Publications 
2020 
The Facebook Oversight Board: Creating an Independent 
Institution to Adjudicate Online Free Expression 
Kate Klonick 
St. John's University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
2418
K A T E K L O N I C K
The Facebook Oversight Board:
Creating an Independent Institution to Adjudicate
Online Free Expression
abstract. For a decade and a half, Facebook has dominated the landscape of digital social
networks, becoming one of the most powerful arbiters of online speech. Twenty-four hours a day,
seven days a week, over two billion users leverage the platform to post, share, discuss, react to, and
access content from all over the globe. Through a system of semipublic rules called “Community
Standards,” Facebook has created a body of “laws” and a system of governance that dictate what
users may say on the platform. In recent years, as this intricately built system to dispatch the com-
pany’s immense private power over the public right of speech has become more visible, Facebook
has experienced intense pressure to become more accountable, transparent, and democratic, not
only in how it creates its fundamental policies for speech but also in how it enforces them.
In November 2018, after years of entreaty from the press, advocacy groups, and users, CEO
and founder Mark Zuckerberg announced that Facebook would construct an independent over-
sight body to be researched, created, and launched within the year. The express purpose of this
body was to serve as an appellate review system for user content and to make content-moderation
policy recommendations to Facebook. This Feature empirically documents the creation of this in-
stitution, now called the Facebook Oversight Board. The Board is a historic endeavor both in scope
and scale.
The Feature traces the events and influences that led to Facebook’s decision to create the Over-
sight Board. It details the year-long process of creating the Board, relying on hundreds of hours of
interviews and embedded research with the Governance Team charged with researching, planning,
and building this new institution.
The creation of the Oversight Board and its aims are a novel articulation of internet govern-
ance. This Feature illuminates the future implications of the new institution for global freedom of
expression. Using the lens of adjudication, it analyzes what the Board is, what the Board means to
users, and what the Board means for industry and governments. Ultimately, the Feature concludes
that the Facebook Oversight Board has great potential to set new precedent for user participation
in private platforms’ governance and a user right to procedure in content moderation.
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introduction
On May 23, 2019, a video of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the United States
House of Representatives, suddenly began circulating online. Supposedly foot-
age from a speech given the night before at a Center for American Progress event,
the video seemed to show Pelosi “garbled and warped,” and as the clip quickly
spread, commenters described her as “drunk” and a “babbling mess.”1 Former
New York City mayor and Republican operative Rudy Giuliani tweeted a link to
the video stating, “What is wrong with Nancy Pelosi? Her speech pattern is bi-
zarre” 2 as the clip went viral, particularly through conservative websites. 3
Though concern was momentarily raised about a “deep fake,” within a few hours
it was established that in fact the video had simply been slowed down to seventy-
five percent speed, causing a deepening of Pelosi’s voice, seemingly exaggerated
pauses, and slurring,4 all resulting in Pelosi appearing mentally unwell or intox-
icated. The quick spread of this inauthentic depiction of Pelosi resulted in calls
on social-media platforms to remove the video. YouTube was the first platform
to comply, stating that “the Pelosi videos violated company policies and have
been removed.”5 But the video had not gone viral on YouTube in nearly the same
way as it had on Facebook, and Facebook refused to remove it. In an interview
with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, Monika Bickert—Facebook’s Vice President of
Global Policy Management—explained that “if there were misinformation that
was, let’s say, tied to an ongoing riot or the threat of some physical violence
somewhere in the world, we would work with safety organizations on the
1. Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk, Spread Across Social Me-
dia, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23
/faked-pelosi-videos-slowed-make-her-appear-drunk-spread-across-social-media [https://
perma.cc/3S2H-M5QN].
2. Id. The tweet has since been deleted. Id.
3. On the Facebook page “Politics WatchDog,” the video “had been viewed more than 2 million
times by [the evening of May 23], been shared more than 45,000 times, and garnered 23,000
comments.” Id.
4. Id. The video was not a “deep fake” under the traditional definition. “Deep fakes” use machine
learning and newly accessible CGI technology to create videos from whole cloth of people
saying and doing things they never did. See Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A
Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1758
(2019).
5. Harwell, supra note 1.
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ground to confirm falsity and the link to violence and then we actually would
remove that misinformation.”6
Bickert’s description of the considerations of authenticity, safety, and im-
portance to political discourse in Facebook’s decision not to remove the video
relates to the so-called Values of the site, which the platform balances when de-
termining whether to remove content posted by users.7 But the Values are just
the principles supporting an extensive system to review all user-generated con-
tent, not only viral videos of political figures. Specifically, Facebook’s Values—
“[v]oice,” offset by authenticity, safety, privacy, and dignity—inform a much
more detailed and specific set of rules to regulate content called “Community
Standards.”8 The implementation of these Standards has resulted in the build-
out of a massive system of governance for the screening, reporting, reviewing,
and removal of content that violates the rules of the site—a process known as
content moderation.9 As a private platform, Facebook can and does maintain ex-
clusive control over the rules and enforcement used to moderate speech on the
site. Legal protections for online platforms, as well as American free-speech
norms, influenced the early development of Facebook’s content policies.10
For many Americans, Facebook’s response to the Pelosi video was perhaps
their first moment of understanding the power of private platforms to review
speech, though in the last five years these issues have received greater and greater
attention. As Facebook has become a ubiquitous and necessary presence in public
discourse, public awareness of its censorial control has steadily increased, as have
demands for greater accountability and transparency to users about how such
6. Cooper Grills Facebook VP for Keeping Pelosi Video Up, CNN (May 25, 2019), https://edition
.cnn.com/videos/tech/2019/05/25/facebook-monika-bic¨kert-pelosi-video-cooper-intv-sot
-ac360-vpx.cnn [https://perma.cc/DG3Z-Y2J4].
7. Monika Bickert, Updating the Values that Inform Our Community Standards, FACEBOOK NEWS-
ROOM (Sept. 12, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/09/updating-the-values-that
-inform-our-community-standards [https://perma.cc/2UGB-VBKT].
8. Id.
9. See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online Speech,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1601 n.11 (2018) (“I use the terms ‘moderate,’ ‘curate,’ and sometimes
‘regulate’ to describe the behavior of these private platforms in both keeping up and taking
down user-generated content. I use these terms rather than using the term ‘censor,’ which
evokes the ideas of only removal of material and various practices of culturally expressive dis-
cipline or control.”).
10. Perhaps the most significant of these legal protections is Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018), and its subsequently broad interpretation by the courts.
See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that one of the pur-
poses of intermediary immunity in Section 230 was to protect the free speech of platform us-
ers).
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decisions are made. Part I of this Feature describes the history and trajectory of
Facebook’s content moderation, discussing the primitive years of content mod-
eration on the platform, its evolution to a more systematic set of internal rules,
and the eventual development of those rules into its outward-facing Community
Standards.
The integration of the details of those once-secret internal content-modera-
tion rules into the external Community Standards was an essential, if long over-
due, moment for Facebook following years of calls from academics, civil society,
media, and users demanding more transparency from the platform. But while
these new public Community Standards introduced some level of transparency
into the black box of Facebook’s speech governance system, they also under-
scored Facebook’s overall lack of user participation in creating, updating, and
enforcing the rules dictating their speech online. As advocates aligned anew on
content-moderation principles,11 experts published books documenting the sys-
tem and pushing for reform,12 and the press reflected users’ outcry,13 the topic
11. See, e.g., David Kaye (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 3, 45, 70, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018) (calling on companies to align their speech codes with standards
embodied in international human-rights law, particularly the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR)); THE SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES ON TRANSPARENCY AND AC-
COUNTABILITY IN CONTENT MODERATION, https://santaclaraprinciples.org [https://perma.cc
/7L88-76NL] [hereinafter SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES].
12. The last few years have seen a number of scholars publish foundational books on the inter-
section of private platform governance, online speech, and democracy. In order of publication
date: REBECCA MACKINNON, CONSENT OF THE NETWORKED (2012); DANIELLE KEATS CITRON,
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER
AND FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST (2017); TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE
INTERNET: PLATFORMS, CONTENT MODERATION, AND THE HIDDEN DECISIONS THAT SHAPE SO-
CIAL MEDIA (2018); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, ANTISOCIAL MEDIA: HOW FACEBOOK DISCONNECTS
US AND UNDERMINES DEMOCRACY (2018); JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER
(2019); MIKE GODWIN, THE SPLINTERS OF OUR DISCONTENT (2019); DAVID KAYE, SPEECH PO-
LICE: THE GLOBAL STRUGGLE TO GOVERN THE INTERNET (2019); JEFF KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-
SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET (2019); SARAH T. ROBERTS, BEHIND THE SCREEN:
CONTENT MODERATION IN THE SHADOWS OF SOCIAL MEDIA (2019); NICOLAS P. SUZOR, LAW-
LESS: THE SECRET RULES THAT GOVERN OUR DIGITAL LIVES (2019); SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE
AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM (2019).
13. See, e.g., Julia Angwin et al., Breaking the Black Box: What Facebook Knows About You, PROPUB-
LICA: MACHINE BIAS (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/breaking-the
-black-box-what-facebook-knows-about-you [https://perma.cc/VJQ4-26VC]; Julia Angwin
& Hannes Grassegger, Facebook’s Secret Censorship Rules Protect White Men from Hate Speech but
Not Black Children, PROPUBLICA: MACHINE BIAS (June 28, 2017), https://www.propublica.org
/article/facebook-hate-speech-censorship-internal-documents-algorithms [https://perma.cc
/M4LT-8YWZ]; Catherine Buni & Soraya Chemaly, The Secret Rules of the Internet: The Murky
History of Moderation, and How It’s Shaping the Future of Free Speech, VERGE (Apr. 13, 2016),
the facebook oversight board
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of accountability in online speech rose into the public consciousness. In April
2018, Facebook began to indicate openly that it was taking the new public reac-
tion seriously.14 CEO and founder Mark Zuckerberg stated in an interview that
one could “imagine some sort of structure, almost like a Supreme Court, that is
made up of independent folks who don’t work for Facebook, who ultimately
make the final judgment call on what should be acceptable speech in a commu-
nity that reflects the social norms and values of people all around the world.”15
This brings us to the primary focus of this Feature. Following his spring 2018
statement about a “Supreme Court”-like structure, and in response to
longstanding and increasingly vocal criticism demanding user accountability,
Zuckerberg announced in November 2018 that Facebook would create an “Inde-
pendent Governance and Oversight” committee by the close of 2019 to advise on
content policy and listen to user appeals on content decisions.16 Part II docu-
ments the creation of this novel institution, relying on exclusive embedded access
to the internal Facebook team charged with creating the Oversight Board, inter-
views with the Board’s architects, and primary-source documents.17 It seeks to
https://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderator-history-youtube
-facebook-reddit-censorship-free-speech [https://perma.cc/A256-296B]; Adrian Chen, The
Laborers Who Keep Dick Pics and Beheadings Out of Your Facebook Feed, WIRED (Oct. 23, 2014,
6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/10/content-moderation [https://perma.cc/UL37
-NBX4]; Nick Hopkins, Revealed: Facebook’s Internal Rulebook on Sex, Terrorism and Violence,
GUARDIAN (May 21, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/may/21/revealed
-facebook-internal-rulebook-sex-terrorism-violence [https://perma.cc/SG28-QH7D]; Jef-
frey Rosen, Google’s Gatekeepers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 28, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com
/2008/11/30/magazine/30google-t.html [https://perma.cc/C3F3-ACM2].
14. Monika Bickert, Publishing Our Internal Enforcement Guidelines and Expanding Our Appeals
Process, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Apr. 24, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04
/comprehensive-community-standards [https://perma.cc/CTQ4-FU28].
15. Ezra Klein, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s Hardest Year, and What Comes Next, VOX (Apr. 2,
2018, 6:00 AM EST), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17185052/mark-zuckerberg-facebook
-interview-fake-news-bots-cambridge [https://perma.cc/4GAX-LTZU].
16. Mark Zuckerberg, A Blueprint for Content Governance and Enforcement, FACEBOOK (Nov.
15, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-zuckerberg/a-blueprint-for-content
-governance-and-enforcement/10156443129621634 [https://perma.cc/XP5S-2NU6].
17. My conditions for this access were that all conversations were free from any nondisclosure
agreement and that I must be allowed to tape all interviews. I received no funding from Face-
book and was funded entirely by individual research grants from the Knight Foundation,
Charles Koch Institute, and MacArthur Foundation. This level of access is somewhat unprec-
edented and understandably raises questions as to Facebook’s motivations for allowing an
individual such a level of insight into their process. When I asked this question to Facebook
directly, I was told that I was the only academic or reporter who asked to embed with the
Governance Team and thus the only one granted access. While this may in part be true, it
seems undeniable other motives likely exist. To this I can only speculate, but I believe the
motivations were centered around concerns regarding the Board’s legitimacy. To that end, my
the yale law journal 129:2418 2020
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lend transparency to Facebook’s internal deliberations in deciding how to design
and implement the Board.
Underscoring this descriptive analysis, however, is a core question: what
motivates and incentivizes Facebook to create such an oversight body? The po-
tential answers to this question reflect a mix of idealism, skepticism, and cyni-
cism. From the most dewy-eyed perspective, Facebook’s decision to create the
Board is a noble moment of goodwill. Skeptically seen, the creation of the Board
is a giant public-relations move: an effort to give the appearance of caring about
users and their input on Facebook’s speech policies in order to bolster trust in
the company. More cynically, once the Board is up and running, it might also be
a convenient scapegoat for controversial content-moderation decisions—like the
Pelosi video decision—that Facebook currently is forced to absorb alone. The
availability of an independent board that can take on review of such decisions
provides an easy escape from scrutiny: “Don’t blame Facebook for this deci-
sion—it was the Board’s!” Beyond these considerations, it is also imperative to
remember the current regulatory pressures bearing down on Facebook and other
major platforms. The European Union has led the charge in pushing back on
private platforms through privacy measures like the General Data Protection
Regulation and litigation through the European Court of Justice.18 Even the
United States, hamstrung in directly regulating content and privacy by First
Amendment concerns, has turned to discussions of antitrust regulation to break
up the “monopolies” of big tech as well as an empowered Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) to levy fines for user-privacy violations.
All of these factors might boil down to a central issue: economics. Fines from
Europe and the FCC and threats of splitting Facebook’s products risk diminish-
ing Facebook’s bottom line. Though the Board does not directly resolve these
concerns, its creation might show a good-faith effort by Facebook not to hoard
its power and instead involve its users in critical decision-making—which might
prove useful in the looming legal battles. The Board also speaks more broadly to
reporting, research, and publication of this Feature could be leveraged to gain elite buy-in on
the project and to demonstrate the platform’s commitment to transparency and accountability
on a project that was centrally about transparency and accountability. To the best of my ability,
I have tried to remain aware and vigilant not only of Facebook’s motivations for allowing me
to observe this process but also of not hinging my research or writing on this access.
18. See, e.g., Jennifer Daskal & Kate Klonick, Opinion, When a Politician Is Called a ‘Lousy Traitor,’
Should Facebook Censor It?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019
/06/27/opinion/facebook-censorship-speech-law.html [https://perma.cc/C7BJ-4P77];
Daphne Keller, Dolphins in the Net: Internet Content Filters and the Advocate General’s Glaw-
ischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Opinion, STAN. CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 24,
2019), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/files/Dolphins-in-the-Net-AG-Analysis.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z7UG-AMTT]; Adam Satariano, G.D.P.R., A New Privacy Law, Makes Europe
World’s Leading Tech Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/05/24/technology/europe-gdpr-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/FDP6-U4NV].
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the core of Facebook’s economic model: its ability to draw and keep users on its
site in order to view advertising. Users’ decisions to use Facebook depend on
their trust of the platform. Facebook’s creation of the Oversight Board is an in-
vestment in building user trust, which is a long-term strategy for continued eco-
nomic growth.
Facebook thus has myriad incentives to make the Board a meaningful adju-
dicatory body—or, more cynically, to make the Board appear to be a meaningful
adjudicatory body. To do this, the Board must involve users in content modera-
tion and have jurisdictional, intellectual, and financial independence from Face-
book. Whether the Board achieves this through its founding documents is the
subject of the final Part of this Feature. That Part explores four remaining ques-
tions: what the Board is vis-à-vis existing legal models; the power of the proce-
dural right it grants to users and the structures that make it independent from
Facebook; what the Board might mean for users; and finally, what the Board
might mean for industry and government.
Ultimately, however, the success or failure of the Board does not change its
impact on history. The mere experiment, and the lessons taken from it, will have
an indelible influence on the future of global online speech and user participation
in transnational internet governance.
i . before the board: facebook ’s history with content
moderation
It is impossible to talk about the Oversight Board without first discussing
the history of content moderation at Facebook. Content moderation is the in-
dustry term for a platform’s review of user-generated content posted on its site
and the corresponding decision to keep it up or take it down.19 Content moder-
ation—though for years hidden from public view within private platforms and
not always conceived in those terms—has existed as long as the internet and pre-
sented a seemingly impossible problem: how to impose a global set of rules on
speech without a global set of norms on speech and how to do that at scale.20
Understanding the history of industry struggle with content moderation is es-
sential to understanding the Oversight Board, which—while perhaps the most
elaborate mechanism designed to respond to the seemingly intractable quandary
of governing online speech on a global scale—is only the latest in a long series of
attempts.
19. See SUZOR, supra note 12, at 15-17.
20. Not all systems of content moderation are created equal. Facebook is unique in its sophisti-
cated system of governance for removing and moderating user speech. See ROBERTS, supra
note 12, at 4-6.
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This Part unfolds the history of content moderation at Facebook and external
calls for transparency and accountability. It then discusses the various industry-
wide attempts to create mechanisms for user accountability in online speech plat-
forms, concluding with the series of events culminating in Facebook’s decision
to create the Oversight Board.
A. How Facebook Moderates Online Speech
Before diving into the private governance system that Facebook created to
moderate users’ speech, it is necessary to take a moment to understand the laws
that underlie that development.21 Though Facebook is now a global platform
with over two billion users, at its inception in 2004 it was a website of static
pages open only to students with harvard.edu email addresses.22 Facebook, like
other speech platforms, was and is a private company that may police its users’
speech without constraint by the First Amendment.23 But early in the history of
the internet, it was unclear if platforms’ policing of speech on their sites would
also make them civilly liable as publishers.24 This was resolved when Section 230
of the Communications Decency Act, passed in 1996, immunized platforms
21. Facebook’s content-moderation governance system is one of a multitude of transnational gov-
ernance systems that have “multiplied” in the last fifty years but that use the same governance
terminology to describe various governance forms. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 202-37. Co-
hen’s theoretical analysis of these various governance literatures is excellent, and Part III ex-
plores it in more detail as it relates to Facebook and the Oversight Board.
22. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COMPANY THAT IS
CONNECTING THE WORLD 82-83 (2010); Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, https://
newsroom.fb.com/company-info [https://perma.cc/WRP3-PYWA].
23. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1601-02. The question whether the First Amendment restricts
how the government uses social media presents a different and important new doctrinal chal-
lenge that others have expertly analyzed and that is currently the subject of active litigation.
See Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019)
(affirming the district court’s holding that President Trump’s blocking users from his Twitter
account violated the First Amendment); Lyrissa Lidsky, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975
(2011) (addressing government actors’ use of social media and the impact on the public-forum
doctrine); Helen Norton & Danielle Keats Citron, Government Speech 2.0, 87 DENVER U. L.
REV. 899 (2010) (discussing the ways in which the government-speech doctrine might be
altered in light of many governments’ increased dependence on social-media platforms); cf.
Eric Goldman, Why Section 230 Is Better Than the First Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
REFLECTION 33, 33 (2019) (arguing that Section 230 “provides defendants with more substan-
tive and procedural benefits than the First Amendment”).
24. See KOSSEFF, supra note 12, at 45.
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from civil liability for speech posted by users.25 This allowed platforms to mod-
erate content on their sites and paved the way for Facebook to develop its own
set of semipublic rules called “Community Standards” alongside a robust system
for updating and enforcing them.26
With over 2.5 billion active users per month,27 Facebook cannot and does not
proactively police all violations of its rules.28 When a user uploads a piece of con-
tent like a photo or prerecorded video, “ex ante” automated detection screens it.29
Though there have recently been steps forward in using artificial intelligence to
screen for things like extremism and hate speech,30 the vast majority of this sys-
tem works by matching the uploaded content against a database of already-
25. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018). Despite the broad shield for platforms, Section 230 expressly states
that no internet entity has immunity from federal criminal law, intellectual property law, or
communications privacy law. Id. § 230(e).
26. See KOSSEFF, supra note 12, at 244-45; Goldman, supra note 23.
27. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2019 Results
(Jan. 29, 2020), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2020/Facebook
-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2019-Results/default.aspx [https://perma.cc
/R3T2-2G3P]. An often overlooked distinction is the difference between individual pieces of
content that a user uploads or posts—status updates, photos, videos—and what Facebook
dubs “complex objects,” such as pages or groups. For the purposes of this Feature, and because
it is the only thing under consideration in the initial scope of the Board, the term “content”
will refer only to the former. For greater detail, see Section II.B infra.
28. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1635 (“Content moderation happens at many levels. It can happen
before content is actually published on the site, as with ex ante moderation, or after content
is published, as with ex post moderation. These methods can be either reactive, in which mod-
erators passively assess content and update software only after others bring the content to
their attention, or proactive, in which teams of moderators actively seek out published content
for removal. Additionally, these processes can be automatically made by software or manually
made by humans.”).
29. Id. at 1636-37; see also Sarah T. Roberts, Abuse, in UNCERTAIN ARCHIVES (Nanna Bonde Thyl-
strup et al. eds., forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 7-8), https://escholarship.org/content
/qt2mp4715x/qt2mp4715x.pdf?t=pufbnf [https://perma.cc/2VDV-RPXX] (explaining how
Facebook uses PhotoDNA to screen images posted to their platform).
30. See, e.g., Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. 84 (Apr. 11, 2018) (testimony of Mark Zuckerberg, CEO,
Facebook) (“And, in addition to that, we have a number of AI tools that we are developing,
like the ones that I had mentioned, that can proactively go flag the content.”); Community
Standards Enforcement Report, FACEBOOK (Nov. 2019), https://transparency.facebook.com
/community-standards-enforcement [https://perma.cc/6KQ8-4R2Z] (explaining process
and removal statistics for different types of content, including hate speech, child nudity, and
sexual exploitation).
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known illegal or impermissible content using what is known as “hash technol-
ogy.”31 Other forms of ex ante moderation employ users’ locations to moderate
the content they see. Known as “geo-blocking,” these types of moderation em-
ploy users’ internet protocol (IP) addresses, which can be roughly linked to ge-
ographical boundaries and thus allow platforms to distinguish content that
might be legal to post in one country but illegal to post or view in another.32
These automatic takedown mechanisms work hand in glove with manual
identification of content from the site.33 For example, in reaction to public outcry
around terrorist and extremist content hosted on the site, Facebook created a
proactive34 team of moderators to look for and delete such content, pages, and
groups.35 Once identified by Facebook’s moderators, the content can be hashed
31. This methodology was pioneered by technology called PhotoDNA, invented by Professor
Hany Farid and Microsoft to address the problems of child pornography. Tracy Ith, Microsoft’s
PhotoDNA: Protecting Children and Businesses in the Cloud, MICROSOFT NEWS (July 15, 2015),
https://news.microsoft.com/features/microsofts-photodna-protecting-children-and
-businesses-in-the-cloud [https://perma.cc/H7F7-KSB7]; see also Kate Klonick, Inside the
Team at Facebook that Dealt with the Christchurch Shooting, NEW YORKER (Apr. 25, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/inside-the-team-at-facebook-that-dealt
-with-the-christchurch-shooting [https://perma.cc/UW3Z-5S7Z] (“To remove videos or
photos, platforms use ‘hash’ technology, which was originally developed to combat the spread
of child pornography online. Hashing works like fingerprinting for online content: whenever
authorities discover, say, a video depicting sex with a minor, they take a unique set of pixels
from it and use that to create a numerical identification tag, or hash. The hash is then placed
in a database, and, when a user uploads a new video, a matching system automatically (and
almost instantly) screens it against the database and blocks it if it’s a match. Besides child
pornography, hash technology is also used to prevent the unauthorized use of copyrighted
material, and over the last two and a half years it has been increasingly used to respond to the
viral spread of extremist content, such as ISIS-recruitment videos or white-nationalist prop-
aganda, though advocates concerned with the threat of censorship complain that tech compa-
nies have been opaque about how posts get added to the database.”).
32. Geo-blocking typically is done following a request from a government notifying a platform
that a certain type of posted content violates its local laws. For a thorough and excellent ex-
planation of geo-blocking, see JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?
ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD 1-10 (2006).
33. See Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 52 CORNELL INT’L L.J. (forthcoming
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3521619 [https://perma.cc/66NP-WE6Y]. For a high-level
discussion of the problems evinced by this dynamic, see Tim Wu, Will Artificial Intelligence
Eat the Common Law? The Rise of Hybrid Social-Ordering Systems, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2001
(2020).
34. By proactive, I mean proactive from the perspective of the platform through its “proactive”
action to use its own employees to look for and remove content violating the Community
Standards.
35. Natalie Andrews & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Steps up Efforts Against Terrorism, WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 11, 2016, 7:39 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-steps-up-efforts
-against-terrorism-1455237595 [https://perma.cc/JVU3-6XRN]. Though not the focus of this
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and compared against future uploaded content, not just on Facebook but also on
other sites using the same technology.36 Besides using Facebook employees, this
cooperation between human moderation and automatic ex ante moderation can
also involve Facebook users. For example, in identifying and controlling spam,
Facebook can often algorithmically identify new spam postings based on the be-
havior of the poster, the proliferation on the site, and the targeting of the content.
But Facebook also informs its algorithms and automatic takedowns with infor-
mation gathered from users reactively37 and manually38 reporting spam. Thus,
the manual and automatic systems work together to iteratively develop a data-
base of content to be automatically removed from the site.39
Human decision-making is an essential part of speech moderation, especially
as Facebook increasingly uses automated methods to both initially identify and
adjudicate content.40 Historically, Facebook’s proactive moderation was largely
Feature, platform censorship of speech at the behest or encouragement of governments raises
questions of collateral censorship and state-action doctrine. See Danielle Keats Citron, Ex-
tremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035
(2017).
36. In 2016, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube announced they would work together to
create a shared industry database of online terrorist content. Partnering to Help Curb Spread of
Online Terrorist Content, FACEBOOK (Dec. 5, 2016), https://about.fb.com/news/2016/12
/partnering-to-help-curb-spread-of-online-terrorist-content [https://perma.cc/8DFG
-U2VB]. This database later became Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. Global In-
ternet Forum to Counter Terrorism: Evolving an Institution, GLOBAL INTERNET F. TO COUNTER
TERRORISM, https://gifct.org/about [https://perma.cc/895Q-Q88S].
37. By reactively, I mean reactive from the perspective of the platform through its “reactive” reli-
ance on “ex post flagging” by platform users in order to allow “review by human content
moderators against internal guidelines.” Klonick, supra note 9, at 1638; see Kate Crawford &
Tarleton Gillespie, What Is a Flag for? Social Media Reporting Tools and the Vocabulary of Com-
plaint, 18 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 410, 411 (2016).
38. See, e.g., James Parsons, Facebook’s War Continues Against Fake Profiles and Bots, HUFFPOST
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/facebooks-war-continues-against-fake
-profiles-and-bots_b_6914282 [https://perma.cc/3X6E-7AJ7].
39. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 33; Robert Gorwa et al., Algorithmic Content Moderation: Tech-
nical and Political Challenges in the Automation of Platform Governance, 7 BIG DATA & SOC’Y 1
(2020).
40. As discussed infra Section III.C.3, the platform’s ability to automatically censor has long-dis-
cussed risks. Because it happens prepublication, ex ante content moderation is the type of
prior restraint with which scholars like Jack Balkin are concerned. See Jack M. Balkin, Free
Speech Is a Triangle, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2011 (2018) (describing how prior-restraint regimes
censor without judicial analysis on whether or not speech is protected); see also Bloch-Wehba,
supra note 33; Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1003-05 (2008) (describing the lack of incentives in
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s notice-and-takedown provisions for platforms to in-
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confined to certain kinds of extreme content and limited by the nascent state of
video- and photo-recognition technology.41 The platform predominantly de-
pended on users to flag violating speech.42 This is quickly changing.43 In the
third quarter of 2019, nearly 100% of spam and fake accounts, 98.4% of adult
nudity and sexual violations, and 98.6% of graphic and violent content on Face-
book were found and flagged by the site before users notified the platform.44 In
other categories of banned material, proactive moderation is less effective. Face-
book found and removed hate speech before users reported it only 80.2% of the
time and only 16.1% of the time in cases of bullying and harassment.45
Whether already identified by Facebook or not, Facebook users flag millions
of pieces of content worldwide every week.46 Users have many reasons for flag-
ging content, and much of what they flag does not violate the Community
Standards. Rather, a vast majority of flagged content reflects personal opinion,
conflict between groups or users, or even abuse of the flagging system to harass
other users.47 Facebook’s reporting process attempts not only to guide users to-
ward categorizing which aspect of the Community Standards is being violated
vestigate before removal and the resulting risk of “suppress[ing] critical speech as well as cop-
yright infringement”); Annemarie Bridy & Daphne Keller, U.S. Copyright Office Section 512
Study: Comments in Response to Notice of Inquiry (Mar. 30, 2016), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2757197 [https://perma.cc/XC6F-DRW8].
41. See James Vincent, AI Won’t Relieve the Misery of Facebook’s Human Moderators, VERGE (Feb. 27,
2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/27/18242724/facebook-moderation-ai-artificial
-intelligence-platforms [https://perma.cc/S7GU-H9QZ].
42. Flagging is the tool provided by Facebook and other platforms to allow users to report poten-
tially offensive content. The use of flagging by social media is both “practical” in that it allows
platforms to enlist users in policing content that the platforms cannot proactively moderate
on their own and “legitimizing” in that it gives users a voice—or at the very least the appear-
ance of a voice—in questioning the content presented to them on the platform. Crawford &
Gillespie, supra note 37, at 411-12.
43. See SUZOR, supra note 12, at 15-17.
44. Community Standards Enforcement Report, supra note 30 (looking at the categories “Spam,”
“Fake Accounts,” “Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity,” and “Violent and Graphic Content” for
July to September 2019, under the subcategory “Of the violating content we actioned, how
much did we find before users reported it?”).
45. Id. (looking at the categories “Hate Speech” and “Bullying and Harassment” for July to Sep-
tember 2019, during which 2,200 pieces of hate-speech content that were removed were re-
stored without an appeal and 169,700 were restored after user appeal).
46. Understanding the Community Standards Enforcement Guide, FACEBOOK (Nov. 13, 2019),
https://transparency.facebook.com/community-standards-enforcement/guide#section5
[https://perma.cc/2GQS-25WL].
47. Radiolab: The Trust Engineers, WNYC STUDIOS (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.wnycstudios.org
/podcasts/radiolab/articles/trust-engineers [https://perma.cc/52VZ-23UF].
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to expedite review but also to urge users toward self-resolution of disputes that
likely fall outside the Standards’ purview.48
Once flagged by a user, the individual piece of content is stripped of user-
identifying elements and placed into an internal tool that “queues” flagged con-
tent to be reviewed by a human content moderator.49 These moderators are hired
directly as Facebook employees or indirectly as contractors.50 Working in front
of computers in call centers all over the world, moderators are trained to deter-
mine if content violates the Community Standards.51 If a moderator determines
that reported content is in violation, it is removed from the site; all content not
found in violation remains published on the platform.52 In contrast to notice-
and-takedown regimes, in the interim between flagging and the moderator’s de-
cision, the flagged piece of content stays up. If the content is not removed, the
user to whom it belongs will never know it was even flagged. If it is removed,
however, users will receive a notification that content they posted violated the
Community Standards of Facebook and was removed.
Errors—both in allowing speech that should be removed to remain up, and
removing speech that should be allowed—occur. Some of these errors—for in-
stance, the removal of the Terror of War photo53—were high-profile. Initially,
users could not appeal a decision on a piece of content.54 Facebook’s appeals sys-
tems only existed for suspended accounts and removed pages.55 Those who had
48. See Alexei Oreskovic, Facebook Reporting Guide Shows How Site Is Policed (Infographic),
HUFFPOST (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/facebook-reporting-guide_n
_1610917 [https://perma.cc/4LHU-BLGD].
49. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 12; SUZOR, supra note 12, at 15-17.
50. See Adrian Chen, Inside Facebook’s Outsourced Anti-Porn and Gore Brigade, Where “Camel Toes”
Are More Offensive Than “Crushed Heads,” GAWKER (Feb. 16, 2012, 3:45 PM), http://
gawker.com/5885714/inside-facebooks-outsourced-anti-porn-and-gore-brigade-where
-camel-toes-are-more-offensive-than-crushed-heads [https://perma.cc/HU7H-972C].
51. See generally ROBERTS, supra note 12; SUZOR, supra note 12, at 15-17.
52. While it might remain on the platform, content might still be censored in other ways. Down-
ranking or interstitial screens are two ways that unfavorable content can remain uncensored
but nonetheless “erased.” This practice is colloquially referred to as shadow banning. evelyn
douek & Kate Klonick, Facebook Releases an Update on Its Oversight Board: Many Questions, Few
Answers, LAWFARE (June 27, 2019, 3:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebook
-releases-update-its-oversight-board-many-questions-few-answers [https://perma.cc/R2JJ
-VGBK].
53. See infra Section I.B.
54. Marjorie Heins, The Brave New World of Social Media Censorship, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 325, 326
(2014) (describing Facebook’s internal appeals process as “mysterious at best” and their inter-
nal policies as secret).
55. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1648.
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their content mistakenly removed had little recourse unless they knew someone
at Facebook or Instagram, were able to leverage a connected civil-society organ-
ization to their cause, or could rally media attention. In this way, the democra-
tizing forces of internet speech in many ways simply recapitulated real-world
power. This changed in 2018 when Facebook began offering expanded appeals
for some types of removed content.56
Since instituting expanded appeals, Facebook has also started issuing quar-
terly transparency reports that provide insight into how content is being re-
moved, appealed, and restored. In the second and third quarters of 2019,57 for
example, 4.28 billion pieces of content were removed from the site.58 Of these,
users appealed 40.9 million takedowns—less than 1% of the total removals59—
and Facebook restored 10.1 million pieces of content, or approximately 24.7% of
removals.60
This is the process of content moderation on Facebook: the how. While still
a mystery to many users, this knowledge is now publicly available and relatively
well known. But for over a decade, it was largely an unquantified phenomenon,
and purposefully so.61 Besides the public-facing Community Standards, which
56. Ian Wren, Facebook Updates Community Standards, Expands Appeals Process, NAT’L PUB. RADIO
(Apr. 24, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/24/605107093/facebook-updates
-community-standards-expands-appeals-process [https://perma.cc/PFD8-PLL9].
57. Community Standards Enforcement Report, supra note 30. Q2 is measured from April through
June, Q3 from July to September. Id.
58. Id. This number considers the categories outlined in the Community Standards Enforcement
Report, including Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, Bullying and Harassment, Child Nudity
and Sexual Exploitation of Children, Hate Speech, Regulated Goods: Drugs, Regulated
Goods: Firearms, Spam, Terrorist Propaganda, Violent and Graphic Content, and Suicide and
Self Injury. Notably, it excludes “Fake Accounts.”
59. Id. Calculated based on the total amount of appealed content (except fake accounts) for Q3
and Q2, divided by the total number of content removals (except fake accounts) for Q3 and
Q2.
60. Id. Calculated based on the total amount of appealed content restored (except fake accounts)
for Q3 and Q2, divided by the total number of content removals (except fake accounts) for Q3
and Q2. These numbers may risk obscuring the varied treatment across types of content, as
different categories of speech have different rates of restoration following appeal. The most
dramatic statistics are those demonstrating how often content is actually restored after appeal.
Across categories, only three types of speech are restored to Facebook after user appeal over
1% of the time: adult nudity and sexual activity (3.05%), bullying and harassment (2.65%),
and hate speech (2.52%). Id. Calculated based on the total number per category of appealed
content restoration for Q2 and Q3, divided by the total amount of all removed content for Q2
and Q3. The other categories of speech have significantly different rates: 0.15% of child nudity
and sexual exploitation, 0.19% of spam, 0.51% of regulated goods: firearms, 0.46% of terrorist
propaganda, and 0.27% of suicide and self-injury are restored after appeal.
61. SUZOR, supra note 12, at 16.
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were broad and vague, the specific rules and mechanisms by which Facebook
removed or kept content on the site were deliberately opaque and carefully
guarded. As will be discussed in the following two Sections, it took years of pub-
lic agitation to generate inquiry not only into the how of content moderation, but
also into who was creating the content-moderation rules and policies. Mechanics
aside, the realization that Facebook—for the most part alone, and for the most
part through a few people headquartered in Silicon Valley—was the sole creator
and decider of the rules governing online speech struck many as deeply prob-
lematic. Small groups of civil-society members, academics, and members of the
press had long been aware of how content moderation functioned. But as Face-
book became an increasingly vital part of public discourse, demands for trans-
parency and accountability on these issues became inescapable. The next two
Sections discuss first the internal players at Facebook involved in creating the
content rules and then the outside influencers who came to play a vital role.
B. Who Controlled the Policies Behind Moderating User Content at Facebook
The individual moderators who review the flagged content described above
are just the final stage of enforcement. Much like a policewoman who arrives to
investigate a complaint and must assess whether illegal activity has occurred,
content moderators are presented with reported user content and tasked with
determining if it violates the site’s terms.62 Those terms, however, are set by in-
dividuals much higher up in the company.
From 2004 to early 2010, Facebook not only lacked a robust team for remov-
ing problematic content but had no real content-moderation policy to speak of.63
Rather, platform-wide moderation was conducted by a team of a few dozen peo-
ple, who were themselves guided by a one-page document of things to delete—
like “Hitler and naked people”—and a general platform ethos of “if it makes you
feel bad in your gut, then go ahead and take it down.”64 It was not until late 2008,
when Dave Willner joined the Trust and Safety team, that the external content-
62. See generally KAYE, supra note 12.
63. As late as November 2009, Facebook had no public policy or “Community Standards” at all.
See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1620; Telephone Interview with Dave Willner, Former Head of
Content Policy, Facebook, and Charlotte Willner, Former Safety Manager, User Operations,
Facebook (Mar. 23, 2016) [hereinafter Telephone Interview with Dave Willner and Charlotte
Willner]. All interviews are on file with the author.
64. Telephone Interview with Dave Willner and Charlotte Willner, supra note 63.
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moderation policies and the underlying rules for use by content moderators be-
gan to take shape.65 Willner, supervised by Jud Hoffman (who led the Trust and
Safety team), eventually wrote a public-facing policy for the platform—the
“Community Standards”—and an intricate 15,000-word Wiki-styled docu-
ment—the “Abuse Standards”—that was internal to the site and spelled out the
enforcement of the Community Standards.66
The era of Facebook content moderation under Willner and Hoffman coin-
cided with the platform’s transition from a monolithic culture and region with
similar norms to a global platform—a transition with which Facebook struggled.
Until 2008, the “if it makes you feel bad, take it down” standard could be easily
understood and enforced by Facebook’s small community of content moderators
and was largely consistent with the values of the relatively small and homoge-
nous “community” of then-existing Facebook users.67 But as the site’s users di-
versified and became more global, and as the increased scale of user content de-
manded a more global and diverse army of content moderators, standards were
no longer a feasible approach. Instead, Willner and Hoffman attempted to create
granular, precise “rules” based on things “you could see in the content” rather
than nonobservable values, feelings, or subjective reactions.68
Despite careful construction for “objective” enforcement, the Community
Standards were by no means neutral, reflective of the norms of global society, or
even reflective of the norms of Facebook users.69 Rather, the early rules reflected
the norms of the drafters: Americans “trained and acculturated in American free
speech norms and First Amendment law” like Hoffman and Willner.70 These
cultural conflicts were an ever-present reality in enforcing the Community
Standards worldwide.71 In trying to resolve clashes between the Western values
that informed Facebook’s rules and the values of local communities in which Fa-
cebook operated, Hoffman tried to turn to Facebook’s mission to “[g]ive people
65. See Telephone Interview with Jud Hoffman, Former Glob. Policy Manager, Facebook (Jan.
22, 2016); Telephone Interview with Dave Willner and Charlotte Willner, supra note 63.
66. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1631-34.
67. Despite Facebook’s long-standing global presence, Willner describes users during his time at
the platform as still relatively homogenous—“mostly American college students.” This rapidly
changed as mobile technology improved and international access developed. Id. at 1633 (quot-
ing Dave Willner and Charlotte Willner).
68. Id.
69. See infra notes 317-320 and accompanying text.
70. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1621.
71. Id.
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the power to build community and bring the world closer together”72 and avoid
adopting “wholesale . . . a kind of U.S. jurisprudence free expression approach.”73
But even the company’s fundamental mission was not culturally neutral—nor
could it have been. As Willner described, “The idea that the world should be
more open and connected is not something that, for example, North Korea
agrees with.”74
Despite this predisposition towards freedom of expression, Facebook’s Com-
munity Standards—which banned pornography,75 hate speech,76 graphic vio-
lence,77 and torture of animals78—were significantly less permissive than First
Amendment doctrine. Indeed, as public pressure increased over the last ten years
and as European nations, like Germany, forced Facebook to comply with their
national speech laws,79 Facebook’s Community Standards became more restric-
tive and more similar to European standards. Largely absent from these Euro-
American Facebook rules, however, is evidence of input from the Global South,
a diverse set of nations and peoples that now comprises the majority of Facebook
users.80
72. About, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/pg/facebook/about [https://perma.cc/3ZV5
-MECX].
73. Klonick, supra note 9, at 1621 (quoting Jud Hoffman).
74. Id. at 1621-22 (quoting Dave Willner and Charlotte Willner). Willner evokes North Korea’s
isolationist stance here as a means of illustrating how even the most basic of premises, “mak-
ing the world open and connected,” does not have universal global uptake as a value or norm.
75. Cf. Miller v. California. 413 U.S. 15, 21, 24 (1973) (changing the previous definition of obscen-
ity from that which is “utterly without redeeming social value,” to that which lacks “serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value,” and thus creating a higher standard for finding
material obscene and unprotected by the First Amendment).
76. Cf. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 445, 458 (2011) (finding that the First Amendment protects
“outrageous,” “offensive,” and “targeted” speech when conducted in a public place on a matter
of public concern).
77. Cf. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (holding a law against violent
video games invalid under the First Amendment as the games did not constitute obscenity
under the Miller test).
78. Cf. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-72 (2010) (holding that depictions of animal
cruelty are not categorically unprotected by the First Amendment).
79. See Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz [NetzDG] [Network Enforcement Act], Sept. 1, 2017,
BGBL I at 3352 (Ger.). Commonly known as “NetzDG,” this German law requires internet
platforms to remove “manifestly illegal” speech within twenty-four hours of flagging, where
“manifestly illegal” is defined by German law, or face fines of up to five million euros.
80. See J. Clement, Leading Countries Based on Facebook Audience Size as of April 2020, STATISTA
(Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/268136/top-15-countries-based-on
-number-of-facebook-users [https://perma.cc/S377-C6KY].
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In April 2018, after over a decade of hiding the internal rules behind the pub-
lic-facing Community Standards, Facebook released one entirely public ver-
sion.81 The rules’ public release was significant because of what this moment of
transparency seemed to promise. During the fourteen years that Facebook’s con-
tent moderation operated in secret, changes—good or bad, controversial or
not—occurred without public knowledge or reaction. The move to transparency
operated as a tacit acknowledgment that Facebook users had a right to know the
rules governing them and voice their reactions. But Facebook’s reveal was not
only insufficient to stem outrage; it in fact fueled further critique. The public’s
discovery that a small cadre of people headquartered in Silicon Valley were the
sole creators and deciders on rules governing this vital global platform for online
speech82 and that, although rules existed, their operation lacked core ideas of
procedure and process added fuel to long-standing comparisons between Face-
book and a feudal state, kingdom, or dictatorship.83
The rise of public awareness and demands for legality around platform con-
tent-moderation governance empowered civil society, academics, and journalists
who had long been working on these issues. The more the platform emerged as
a vital element of public discourse,84 the louder and more frequent the demands
81. Bickert, supra note 14.
82. Jeff Rosen, The Delete Squad, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article
/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-making-rules [https://perma.cc/JB95-5LTV].
83. See, e.g., Doug Cantor, Mark Zuckerberg May Be the CEO of Facebook, but He’s the King of Twit-
ter, INC. (May 9, 2014), https://www.inc.com/doug-cantor/mark-zuckerberg-may-be-the
-ceo-of-facebook-but-hes-the-king-of-twitter.html [https://perma.cc/4W8G-CUBX]; Lau-
rence Dodds, Can Mark Zuckerberg’s ‘Supreme Court’ End Facebook’s Era of Absolute Monarchy?,
TELEGRAPH (June 24, 2019, 8:12 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2019/02/18
/mark-zuckerbergs-supreme-court-would-end-facebooks-era-absolute [https://perma.cc
/AUA6-9Y3X]; Henry Farrell et al., Mark Zuckerberg Runs a Nation-State, and He’s the King,
VOX (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:44 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/4/9/17214752
/zuckerberg-facebook-power-regulation-data-privacy-control-political-theory-data-breach
-king [https://perma.cc/LTB5-A74E]. But see Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L.
REV. 1807 (2012).
84. Many have argued that internet companies and platforms are more than “vital”; they are in-
escapable. See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the
Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621 (2018); TIM WU, THE ATTEN-
TION MERCHANTS (2016); Lina Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE. L.J. 710
(2017). The concept of information fiduciaries links the broader conversation around platform
dominance over commerce to platform dominance over speech. Compare Jack M. Balkin, In-
formation Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185-87 (2016), and
Jack M. Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016
/10/information-fiduciary/502346 [https://perma.cc/MRA9-L77H], with Lina M. Khan &
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from “outside” groups for transparency and accountability became.85 The next
Section turns to how outside actors reacted to and influenced Facebook’s gov-
ernance regime.
C. Outside Influence on Facebook
Although details about Facebook’s content-moderation rules and how they
were enforced may have been hidden from those outside the platform for years,
that does not mean they were not free from external influence. To the contrary,
many of the policy and enforcement decisions made by architects inside Face-
book came about in reaction to external pressures from civil society, govern-
ments, the media, or users.86 Of these, negative media coverage had arguably the
most powerful impact.87
Perhaps the internally most significant moment of journalistic impact was
the scandal accompanying Facebook’s removal of a photograph called “The Ter-
ror of War.”88 In September 2016, a prominent Norwegian writer, Tom Egeland,
posted a graphic but award-winning historical picture to Facebook.89 Taken by
photographer Nick Ut in the midst of the Vietnam War, the black-and-white
photo depicts a naked nine-year-old girl running and screaming down a dirt
David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019). Ad-
ditionally, in an ongoing project, the Electronic Frontier Foundation has worked to document
and present evidence of the negative psychological impact that leaving—either by choice or
by banning—certain social media platforms can have on users. See Submit Report, ONLINE-
CENSORSHIP.ORG, https://onlinecensorship.org/submit-report [https://perma.cc/25NK-
LGA2] (offering a platform for users to report erroneous or unjust account deactivations).
These studies support the theory Lawrence Lessig describes in Code: Version 2.0, in which he
proffers that leaving an internet platform is more difficult and costly than expected. See LAW-
RENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 288-90 (2006); cf. David G. Post, Anarchy, State, and the
Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, 1995 J. ONLINE L., art. 3, ¶ 42 (imagining the
internet as a free market complete with user exit).
85. See, e.g., Helen Nissenbaum, Accountability in a Computerized Society, 2 SCI. & ENG. ETHICS 25
(1996); Nicolas P. Suzor et al., What Do We Mean When We Talk About Transparency? Toward
Meaningful Transparency in Content Moderation, 13 INT’L J. COMM. 1526 (2019).
86. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1648-57.
87. See id. at 1652-55.
88. See Telephone Interview with Peter Stern, Head of Prod. Policy Stakeholder Engagement,
Facebook (Mar. 7, 2018).
89. See Kjetil Malkenes Hovland & Deepa Seetharaman, Facebook Backs Down on Censoring ‘Na-
palm Girl’ Photo, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9, 2016, 3:07 PM ET), http://www.wsj.com/articles
/norway-accuses-facebook-of-censorship-over-deleted-photo-of-napalm-girl-1473428032
[https://perma.cc/CA5S-FWMW].
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street in Trang Bang, Vietnam, following a napalm attack on the city.90 Though
often colloquially referred to as “Napalm Girl,” the title of the photograph is
“The Terror of War,” an era-defining piece of photojournalism for its depiction
of the horror and violence of the Vietnam War.91 Despite its political and cultural
significance, the photo was removed for violating Facebook’s Community Stand-
ards.92 In addition to removing the picture and accompanying post by Egeland,
Facebook suspended Egeland’s account. He immediately posted separately com-
plaining of censorship.93 Egeland’s profile as a well-known author caused the re-
moval of the historic photo to receive its own news coverage, epitomized by the
Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten’s publication of a “letter” to Mark Zuckerberg
on its front page calling for Facebook to take a stand against censorship.94 The
controversy was significant and, for perhaps the first time, crystallized in the
public eye the platform’s broad power to censor not just things like hate speech
or harassment but content of great cultural and historical import. Mere hours
after the controversy ignited, Facebook’s Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sand-
berg issued a statement saying that the platform “[doesn’t] always get it right”
and promising to take a close look at the policies that had resulted in the
takedown of the photo.95
Facebook acknowledges that the public reaction to the “Terror of War”
takedown set off an internal reckoning with its content-moderation policies.96
“After the ‘Terror of War’ controversy, we realized that we had to create new rules
for imagery that we’d normally want to disallow, but for context reasons that
90. Nick Ut, The Terror of War (photograph), http://100photos.time.com/photos/nick-ut
-terror-war [https://perma.cc/YJ59-9ZTU].
91. Mark Scott & Mike Isaac, Facebook Restores Iconic Vietnam War Photo It Censored for Nudity,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/10/technology/facebook
-vietnam-war-photo-nudity.html [https://perma.cc/JY27-LWZD].
92. The photo was likely removed because of involuntary nudity of a minor, not because it was
child pornography. See Hovland & Seetharaman, supra note 89; Scott & Isaac, supra note 91.
93. Hovland & Seetharaman, supra note 89.
94. Id.
95. See Claire Zillman, Sheryl Sandberg Apologizes for Facebook’s ‘Napalm Girl’ Incident, TIME
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://time.com/4489370/sheryl-sandberg-napalm-girl-apology [https://
perma.cc/9KVJ-AN5Q]. Facebook also issued a press release highlighting its commitment to
“allowing more items that people find newsworthy, significant, or important to the public
interest—even if they might otherwise violate our standards.” Joel Kaplan & Justin Osofsky,
Input from Community and Partners on Our Community Standards, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct.
21, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2016/10/input-from-community-and-partners
-on-our-community-standards [https://perma.cc/JCY5-2VJY].
96. See Kate Klonick, Facebook v. Sullivan, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST. (Oct. 1, 2018), https://
knightcolumbia.org/content/facebook-v-sullivan [https://perma.cc/Z8KL-XQ45].
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policy doesn’t work,” explained Peter Stern, who is now head of Product Policy
Stakeholder Engagement at Facebook.97 But the “Terror of War” moment also
illuminated something else that had perhaps been lost in the institutional tran-
sitions within the content policy team: Facebook could not simply solve the
problems presented by content moderation through vigorous content removal;
rather, a more nuanced approach was required in order to satisfy users and es-
cape media controversy. Leaders at the company began to fully understand that
content-moderation policy and enforcement were not just a “customer service”
or “trust and safety issue”—as a communication platform, content moderation
was the product of Facebook.98
In addition to individual high-profile moments of censorship or failure to
remove unsafe content, a number of more general controversies generated neg-
ative press for the company and eroded user trust. The first grew out of Face-
book’s perceived harms to democracy and elections following the 2016 U.S. pres-
idential election and “Brexit,” the British referendum to leave the European
Union.99 Allegations that foreign interference through fake news and disinfor-
97. Telephone Interview with Peter Stern, supra note 88.
98. See GILLESPIE, supra note 12, at 13, 47 (“And moderation is, in many ways, the commodity that
platforms offer.”). There are many competing formulations of what the product of Facebook
is. Many argue that Facebook’s product is advertising and users pay to use Facebook through
the collection of personal data. See, e.g., ZUBOFF, supra note 12 (arguing that platforms’ capi-
talist purpose is to surveil users in order to collect and commoditize their data for the purpose
of selling advertising). But in a microeconomics consumer-theory framework, a product is a
good or service to meet the desire or need of a customer. In this sense, curation of user-gen-
erated content is the service and product Facebook is supplying to its users, who do not pay
for it in money, but instead in data. Thus, data is not the product but in fact the currency of
the system of governance around content moderation. Because content curation is the prod-
uct, it can also be a source of market differentiation between platforms, except if those plat-
forms become so different in kind and dominant in their unique cultures as to preclude exit.
See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, OR-
GANIZATIONS, AND STATES 1-29 (1970).
99. See Philip Bump, All the Ways Trump’s Campaign Was Aided by Facebook, Ranked by Importance,
WASH. POST (Mar. 22, 2018, 2:19 PM EST), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics
/wp/2018/03/22/all-the-ways-trumps-campaign-was-aided-by-facebook-ranked-by
-importance [https://perma.cc/AKH8-QK3U]; Jonathan Freedland, Why Is the BBC Down-
playing the Facebook Brexit Scandal?, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2018, 7:50 AM EDT), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/11/bbc-downplaying-facebook-brexit
-scandal-bias [https://perma.cc/5576-MF6Z]; Alexis C. Madrigal, What Facebook Did to
American Democracy, ATLANTIC (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology
/archive/2017/10/what-facebook-did/542502/ [https://perma.cc/3K92-AKRF]; Peter
Overby, Facebook Acknowledges Russian Ads in 2016 Election. Will Investigations Follow?, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Sept. 8, 2017, 12:21 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2017/09/08/549284183
/facebook-acknowledges-russian-ads-in-2016-election-will-investigations-follow [https://
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mation campaigns affected the outcome of those democratic processes domi-
nated the news cycle and public opinion for months.100 The second major mo-
ment came with the “leak” of user data through the third-party consulting firm
Cambridge Analytica.101 In a press release on March 16, 2018, Facebook acknowl-
edged that the company, run from the United Kingdom, had improperly gained
access and used eighty-seven million Facebook users’ data, with potential effects
on the American election.102 Third and most recently, Facebook was accused of
augmenting civil unrest and perhaps even causing the death of thousands of
Rohingya Muslims, a persecuted ethnic group in Myanmar, when majority
groups used Facebook’s “Free Basics” program and messaging applications (in-
cluding WhatsApp) to mobilize ethnic cleansing mobs.103
The scale of these issues and resultant public outcry triggered new pressure
from Western democratic governments. From 2017 to 2019, the U.S. Senate held
perma.cc/6N9F-R8LW]; Olivia Solon, Facebook’s Failure: Did Fake News and Polarized Politics
Get Trump Elected?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 10, 2016, 5:59 PM EST), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2016/nov/10/facebook-fake-news-election-conspiracy-theories [https://
perma.cc/HG74-LRVQ]; Carole Cadwalladr, Facebook’s Role in Brexit—And the Threat to De-
mocracy, TED Talk (Apr. 2019) (transcript available at https://www.ted.com/talks/carole
_cadwalladr_facebook_s_role_in_brexit_and_the_threat_to_democracy/transcript
[https://perma.cc/49XS-V224]). For an excellent discussion of the potential for “digital ger-
rymandering,” see Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335 (2014).
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
101. See Carole Cadwalladr & Emma Graham-Harrison, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Har-
vested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17, 2018, 6:03 PM EDT),
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence
-us-election [https://perma.cc/FDB6-G6GP]; Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and
Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-fallout.html
[https://perma.cc/3BUF-K6NH]; Issie Lapowsky, How Cambridge Analytica Sparked the Great
Privacy Awakening, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story
/cambridge-analytica-facebook-privacy-awakening [https://perma.cc/Z249-Q5Y5].
102. Press Release, Paul Grewal, VP & Deputy Gen. Counsel, Facebook, Suspending Cambridge
Analytica and SCL Group from Facebook (Mar. 16, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com
/news/2018/03/suspending-cambridge-analytica [https://perma.cc/NJ6K-MSEY].
103. For a contextualized and excellent summary of Facebook’s implication in the conflict in My-
anmar, see evelyn douek, Facebook’s Role in the Genocide in Myanmar: New Reporting Compli-
cates the Narrative, LAWFARE (Oct. 22, 2018, 9:01 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/facebooks-role-genocide-myanmar-new-reporting-complicates-narrative [https://perma.cc
/JY49-NVKC]; and evelyn douek, Why Were Members of Congress Asking Mark Zuckerberg
About Myanmar? A Primer, LAWFARE (Apr. 26, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com
/why-were-members-congress-asking-mark-zuckerberg-about-myanmar-primer [https://
perma.cc/UHS5-9LTU].
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five hearings on the use of technology and its impact on speech, elections, ter-
rorism, and privacy.104 These included Mark Zuckerberg’s testimony before the
Senate following the Cambridge Analytica scandal,105 as well as COO Sheryl
Sandberg’s testimony following the 2016 U.S. presidential election regarding
foreign election interference on social media.106 During the same period, the
House of Representatives held four hearings, centrally focused on platform fil-
tering practices107 and the exploration of bias against American conservatives
104. Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms (Company Witnesses): Open Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2018); Foreign Influence Operations’ Use
of Social Media Platforms (Third Party Expert Witnesses): Open Hearing Before the S. Select
Comm. on Intelligence, 115th Cong. (2018); Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse
of Data: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. and the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018); Terrorism and Social Media: #isbigtechdoingenough?: Hearing Be-
fore the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 115th Cong. (2018); Policy Response to the Rus-
sian Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election: Open Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence,
115th Cong. (2017).
105. Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, supra note 30. For media coverage, see Camila Domonoske, Mark Zuckerberg Tells
Senate: Election Security Is an ‘Arms Race,’ NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 10, 2018, 2:30 PM ET),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/10/599808766/i-m-responsible-for
-what-happens-at-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-will-tell-senate [https://perma.cc/PR6Z-
SWZV]; and Emily Stewart, Lawmakers Seem Confused About What Facebook Does—And How
to Fix It, VOX (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:50 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018
/4/10/17222062/mark-zuckerberg-testimony-graham-facebook-regulations [https://
perma.cc/6L8A-PJ6S].
106. Foreign Influence Operations’ Use of Social Media Platforms (Company Witnesses), supra note 104.
For media coverage, see Farhad Manjoo, What Jack Dorsey and Sheryl Sandberg Taught Congress
and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06
/technology/jack-dorsey-sheryl-sandberg-congress-hearings.html [https://perma.cc/53Y9
-PJH8]; and Ian Sherr, Facebook, Twitter Face Senate Scrutiny Over Data, Foreign Election Inter-
ference, CNET (Sept. 5, 2018, 9:43 AM PDT), https://www.cnet.com/news/watch-live
-facebook-twitter-testify-at-senate-panel-wednesday-google-a-no-show [https://perma.cc
/U46F-N7VD].
107. Facebook, Google and Twitter: Examining the Content Filtering Practices of Social Media Giants:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018); Filtering Practices of Social
Media Platforms: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018). For media
coverage, see Tony Romm, Republicans Accused Facebook, Google and Twitter of Bias.
Democrats Called the Meeting ‘Dumb.’, WASH. POST (July 17, 2018, 2:03 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/07/17/republicans-accused-facebook-google
-twitter-bias-democrats-called-hearing-dumb [https://perma.cc/B3N7-8RCN]; and David
Shepardson, Social Media Companies Defend Filtering Practices Before Congress, REUTERS (July
17, 2018, 1:15 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-congress-socialmedia/social
-media-companies-defend-filtering-practices-before-congress-idUSKBN1K729F [https://
perma.cc/Q2SG-5W7E]. See also Algorithms: How Company’s Decisions About Data and Content
Impact Customers: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commc’ns & Tech. and the Subcomm. on
Dig. Commerce & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. (2017).
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through content moderation.108 The United Kingdom also held four lengthy in-
quiries into the influence of technology.109
Intergovernmental organizations applied a similar level of scrutiny. Six
weeks after his congressional testimony, Mark Zuckerberg testified before the
For media coverage, see Roger Yu, GOP Wrangles Tech Companies, Net Neutrality into Algorithm
Scrutiny, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 29, 2019, 10:58 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/tech-and
-telecom-law/gop-wrangles-tech-companies-net-neutrality-into-algorithm-scrutiny
[https://perma.cc/UW7W-TCMN].
108. Twitter: Transparency and Accountability: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
115th Cong. (2018). For media coverage, see Barbra Ortutay, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey Keeps
His Cool Before Congress, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 5, 2018), https://apnews.com
/653ae998f935478d8a3d3ed00b7543f9 [https://perma.cc/9PME-Z452]; and Sara Salinas, Jack
Dorsey to Congress: ‘Twitter Does Not Use Political Ideology to Make Any Decisions,’ CNBC (Sept.
4, 2018, 1:49 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/09/04/jack-dorsey-to-congress-full-written
-testimony-on-political-bias.html [https://perma.cc/4DGG-M3U6]. See also Facebook:
Transparency and the Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
115th Cong. (2018). For media coverage, see Julia Carrie Wong, Mark Zuckerberg Faces Tough
Questions in Two-Day Congressional Testimony—As It Happened, GUARDIAN (Apr. 11, 2018,
3:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/live/2018/apr/11/mark-zuckerberg
-testimony-live-updates-house-congress-cambridge-analytica [https://perma.cc/A3TF
-6A9W]; and Tony Romm, Facebook’s Zuckerberg Just Survived 10 Hours of Questioning by Con-
gress, WASH. POST (Apr. 11, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the
-switch/wp/2018/04/11/zuckerberg-facebook-hearing-congress-house-testimony [https://
perma.cc/6M83-UBDC].
109. DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, DISINFORMATION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’: IN-
TERIM REPORT, 2017–19, HC 363 (UK); SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, DIGITAL
GOVERNMENT, 2017–19, HC 1455 (UK); DIGITAL, CULTURE, MEDIA, AND SPORT COMMITTEE,
IMMERSIVE AND ADDICTIVE TECHNOLOGIES, 2017–19, HC 1846 (UK); EDUCATION COMMIT-
TEE, FOURTH INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 2017–19, HC 21 (UK). For media coverage, see Mark
D’Arcy, What’s Hot on Committee Corridor?, BBC (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news
/uk-politics-parliaments-45809876 [https://perma.cc/ZQQ7-3JYR]; Derek du Preez, Digital
Government Inquiry Concludes ‘Momentum Has Been Lost and GDS Lost Its Way’, DIGINOMICA
(July 9, 2019), https://diginomica.com/digital-government-inquiry-concludes-momentum
-has-been-lost-and-gds-lost-its-way [https://perma.cc/BA9Y-CLFQ]; Parliamentary Com-
mittee Says Govt’s Digital Approach Has Lost Impetus, GOV’T COMPUTING (July 10, 2019),
https://www.governmentcomputing.com/central-government/news/science-technology
-committee-digital-inquiry [https://perma.cc/QM8A-QSDA]; and James Vincent, The UK
Invited a Robot to ‘Give Evidence’ in Parliament for Attention, VERGE (Oct. 12, 2018, 11:45
AM EDT), https://www.theverge.com/2018/10/12/17967752/uk-parliament-pepper-robot
-invited-evidence-select-committee [https://perma.cc/Q8A7-RZRR].
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European Parliament—the body’s first of a three-part hearing series on the Cam-
bridge Analytica scandal.110 The European Parliament,111 the European Parlia-
ment’s center-left political group,112 and the European Commission113 also paid
attention to the dissemination of fake news on social media. Meanwhile, the UN
has investigated the interface between social media and human rights,114 coun-
ter-terrorism,115 and speech,116 with a special focus on Facebook as a platform
for hate speech directed at Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslim minority.117
110. Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, Hearing on the Facebook/Cambridge Analyt-
ica Case Part I, EUR. PARLIAMENT, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/events
-hearings.html?id=20180529CHE04141 [https://perma.cc/4Y5T-B7K4]; Comm. on Civil
Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs, Hearing on the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica Case Part II,
EUR. PARLIAMENT, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/events-hearings.html
?id=20180613CHE04342 [https://perma.cc/3GXF-VGK9]; Comm. on Civil Liberties, Justice
& Home Affairs, Hearing on the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica Case Part III, EUR. PARLIAMENT,
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/events-hearings.html?id
=20180626CHE04501 [https://perma.cc/3C34-KFLN].
111. Comm. on Culture & Educ., Scientific and Academic Culture to Counter Radicalism and Fake
News, EUR. PARLIAMENT, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/events
-hearings.html?id=20171127CHE03001 [https://perma.cc/63HS-K8WZ].
112. S&D Joint Extremism/Digital Europe Working Group Conference - Fake News: Political and
Legal Challenges, SOCIALISTS & DEMOCRATS GROUP (Sept. 6, 2017), https://
www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/events/sd-joint-extremismdigital-europe-working-group
-conference-fake-news-political-and-legal [https://perma.cc/H27W-A75C].
113. Countering Online Disinformation - Towards a More Transparent, Credible and Diverse Digital
Media Ecosystem, EUR. COMMISSION (Jan. 29, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single
-market/en/news/countering-online-disinformation-towards-more-transparent-credible
-and-diverse-digital-media [https://perma.cc/TPF5-LPWH].
114. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful
Assembly and of Association 2, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/41/41 (May 17, 2019), https://documents
-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G19/141/02/PDF/G1914102.pdf?OpenElement
[https://perma.cc/8NXC-EDVF] (“Facebook, Twitter and YouTube have become the gate-
keepers to people’s ability to enjoy the rights of peaceful assembly and of association . . . .”);
Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on My-
anmar 14, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/64 (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/HRBodies/HRCouncil/FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7B8
-38NX] [hereinafter Myanmar Report].
115. Counter-Terrorism Comm., Open Meeting of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on #CTNarra-
tives, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL (May 11, 2018), https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/event/open
-meeting-counter-terrorism-committee-ctnarratives [https://perma.cc/J2QX-7Q6S].
116. Kaye, supra note 11.
117. Myanmar Report, supra note 114, at 14 (“Facebook has been a useful instrument for those seek-
ing to spread hate, in a context where, for most users, Facebook is the Internet.”). For media
reports, see Alastair Jamieson, U.N. Says Facebook ‘Slow’ to Respond to Myanmar ‘Genocide’
Against Rohingya, NBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2018, 10:36 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/news/world/u-n-says-facebook-slow-respond-myanmar-genocide-against-rohingya
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Though the volume of government attention to the public outcry over Face-
book’s various scandals evinces notions of democratic accountability and pro-
cess, their regulatory power to change these platforms is limited. The transna-
tional operation of technology platforms has moved such entities beyond
traditional notions of regulatory accountability—particularly where speech and
content moderation are concerned. As Jack Balkin has described, public rights
like free expression are now no longer “dyadic”—the classic struggle between
government censorship and citizens—but “pluralist” in that private platforms
now allow users to circumvent government intervention, and platforms can
largely continue to operate successfully despite any one government’s regula-
tion.118 In addition, the ability to regulate platforms has been hampered in the
United States by First Amendment limitations on government restrictions of
speech. This is notably not true of the European Union, which has recently
passed comprehensive privacy regulation and whose courts have issued sweep-
ing rulings to rein in the power of private platforms.119
Before this heightened government interest in platform regulation, civil-so-
ciety groups were actively involved in discussions to construct better platform
governance through policy advocacy, litigation, or independent research.120 One
of the earliest influencers in this area was the Anti-Defamation League (ADL),
which established itself as an early advocate for thoughtful content policy that
balanced hate speech against freedom of expression.121 In comparison, the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) has historically taken a more watchdog-like
role than a collaborative one with platforms.122 Between 2014 and 2019, a num-
-n904056 [https://perma.cc/S772-ACRK]; Casey Newton, One Easy Thing Facebook Should
Do in Myanmar, VERGE (Nov. 10, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/10
/18080962/facebook-myanmar-report-bsr-united-nations-hate-speech [https://perma.cc
/6C7M-UHTC].
118. Balkin, supra note 40, at 2013-14.
119. See generally NetzDG, supra note 79; Council Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, arts.
22, 13, 14, 15 (EU).
120. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1655-57.
121. Id. at 1655.
122. For example, in 2012 EFF launched onlinecensorship.org, a public portal for users to report
platform censorship. Id. at 1656-57; see also What We Do, ONLINECENSORSHIP.ORG,
https://onlinecensorship.org/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/8AJK-AV4R]. As de-
scribed in its mission statement, “Onlinecensorship.org seeks to encourage companies to op-
erate with greater transparency and accountability toward their users as they make decisions
that regulate speech”—principles that align with a pro-freedom of expression sentiment. See
Klonick, supra note 9, at 1656-57; What We Do, supra note 122.
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ber of other civil-society groups have started initiatives to address platform reg-
ulation of online speech.123 This influence has now coalesced into Facebook’s
“Trusted Partner” program which puts nongovernmental organizations into di-
alogue with the platform around important issues of speech.124
The sum of this outside pressure—from media, government, and civil soci-
ety—eventually led to change at Facebook. In addition to more transparency in
the rules, Facebook started to dedicate more staff to their enforcement. In the
wake of Facebook’s much criticized failure to quickly remove a murderer’s video
in April 2017,125 Zuckerberg announced the company would hire 3,000 addi-
tional content moderators,126 a number that later grew to 7,500.127 The fevered
media and government response to Facebook’s harm to elections led to the crea-
tion of Social Science One, a research organization dedicated to looking at the
effects of social media on democracy.128 Finally, the tragedy in Myanmar resulted
directly in code changes to the product to prevent future use of the Messenger
services to create and encourage violent mob behavior, as well as the hiring of
123. The Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT), for example, was a group that splintered
off from EFF to focus on policy efforts in Washington, D.C. Other more general tech and
speech advocacy groups like the Electronic Privacy Information Center, WITNESS, New
America’s Open Technology Institute, AccessNow, Committee to Protect Journalists, and the
ACLU all began making online speech and platform governance part of their work either
through the creation of new roles or new advocacy directives. In contrast to policy advocacy,
a number of these groups also worked for platform policy change through litigation against
platforms and governments. Reno v. ACLU, for example, formed the foundational support for
Section 230 of the CDA allowing—for better or worse—the proliferation of internet platform
self-regulation. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). Today, new organizations like the Knight First Amend-
ment Institute leverage the broadening role of platforms in speech to take aim at government.
124. Trusted Partner Form, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/contact
/1791786581083703?helpref=faq_content [https://perma.cc/GY47-EV4Q].
125. Klonick, supra note 31; Emily Dreyfuss, Facebook Streams a Murder, and Must Now Face Itself,
WIRED (Apr. 16, 2017, 9:26 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/facebook-live-murder
-steve-stephens [https://perma.cc/U4KW-Z6J6].
126. Alex Heath, Facebook Will Hire 3,000 More Moderators to Keep Deaths and Crimes from Being
Streamed, BUS. INSIDER (May 3, 2017, 10:35 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook
-to-hire-3000-moderators-to-keep-suicides-from-being-streamed-2017-5 [https://perma.cc
/M3CZ-TXBH].
127. Alexis C. Madrigal, Inside Facebook’s Fast-Growing Content-Moderation Effort, ATLANTIC (Feb.
7, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/02/what-facebook-told
-insiders-about-how-it-moderates-posts/552632/ [https://perma.cc/D69M-Q7XJ].
128. Our Facebook Partnership, SOC. SCI. ONE, https://socialscience.one/our-facebook-partnership
[https://perma.cc/7XYY-W87F].
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over 100 Burmese-fluent content moderators to recognize flagged hate
speech.129
As will be discussed more extensively in Part III, Facebook’s vulnerability to
collective public action from media, government, and civil society is an im-
portant statement on the platform’s accountability.130 But it is a participatory and
market-based model of accountability, not one based on guarantees of proce-
dural rights or democratic votes. So far, users’ power to influence Facebook
comes from haphazard methods of collective complaint and expectations for re-
sponse. Because disappointment of these expectations hurts Facebook’s bottom
line and long-term viability, Facebook faces a formidable challenge: it needs to
preserve private power over its policy and product, while ensuring long-term
engagement by meeting user expectations of accountability. The following Part
details Facebook’s efforts to meet this challenge through a new public-private
governance regime: the Oversight Board.
i i . institution building: creating the oversight board
In the wake of revelations about Facebook’s role in the 2016 U.S. presidential
election, Mark Zuckerberg hosted a number of dinners for different groups of
academics and advocates at his home to discuss what Facebook could do bet-
ter.131 These salons seem to have been the beginning of acculturing the CEO to
the broader conversation around private governance in content moderation and
privacy.
The Santa Clara Principles on Transparency and Accountability in Content
Moderation were born in this new moment of leverage. Drafted by a diverse
group of content-moderation academics—Irina Raicu, Sarah T. Roberts, Nic Su-
zor, and Sarah Myers West—and joined by EFF, ACLU Foundation of Northern
California, CDT, and New America’s Open Technology Institute, the Principles
129. Sarah Su, Update on Myanmar, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 15, 2018), https://newsroom.fb
.com/news/2018/08/update-on-myanmar [https://perma.cc/S46U-RBGW].
130. See Jürgen Habermas, Political Communication in Media Society: Does Democracy Still Enjoy an
Epistemic Dimension? The Impact of Normative Theory on Empirical Research, 16 COMM. THEORY
411, 419 (2006); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97
VA. L. REV. 617, 624 (2011) (“Public opinion could not create democratic legitimacy if it were
merely the voice of the loudest or the most violent . . . . Public opinion can therefore serve the
cause of democratic legitimacy only if it is at least partially formed in compliance with the
civility rules that constitute reason and debate.”).
131. Interview with Sarah T. Roberts (May 30, 2019) (describing attending one of several such
dinners at the home of Mark Zuckerberg in 2017).
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declared three “initial steps” the companies must take in order to provide “mean-
ingful due process” on platforms.132 The first steps addressed issues of transpar-
ency relating to content-moderation statistics and notice to users whose content
is removed, but the core of the initiative lay in the final principle. The Third
Santa Clara Principle urged online speech platforms to create “meaningful op-
portunity for timely appeal” for their users and in the long term consider “inde-
pendent external review processes.”133
The focus on the idea of an independent external appeals process or an inde-
pendent multistakeholder body in order to create accountability for online
speech platforms was important but not new.134 In January 2018, Noah Feldman,
a constitutional-law professor, wrote a brief memo spelling out the details for a
“Facebook Supreme Court,” the virtues such a tribunal would have to embody,
and how it might solve both Facebook’s and Facebook’s users’ problems.135 In
getting buy-in for his idea, Feldman had something many others did not: a close
friendship with Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg. Feldman passed the memo to
Sandberg, who passed it to Zuckerberg.136
As it turns out, as both the Santa Clara Principles and Feldman were lobby-
ing for the idea of an external independent appellate body, the concept was also
in the works at the company.137 In April 2018, these ideas began to surface in
public talking points from Facebook’s leadership. Monika Bickert, Facebook’s
head of Global Policy Management, stated that the platform was “going to build
out the ability for people to appeal our decisions” because “[w]e believe giving
132. See SANTA CLARA PRINCIPLES, supra note 11.
133. Id.
134. MacKinnon was one of the first to document and identify the potential of stakeholder influ-
ence in private internet governance. See MACKINNON, supra note 12, at 243-48; see also Klonick,
supra note 9, at 1665 (“[T]he lack of an appeals system for individual users and the open
acknowledgment of different treatment and rule sets for powerful users over others reveal that
a fair opportunity to participate is not currently a prioritized part of platform moderation sys-
tems.”).
135. Memorandum from Noah Feldman on a Supreme Court for Facebook to Facebook (Jan. 30,
2018) (on file with author); Skype Interview with Noah Feldman, Professor, Harvard Law
School (May 30, 2019).
136. See Mark Sullivan, Exclusive: The Harvard Professor Behind Facebook’s Oversight Board Defends
Its Role, FAST COMPANY (July 8, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90373102/exclusive
-the-harvard-professor-behind-facebooks-oversight-board-defends-its-role [https://
perma.cc/STJ9-WMFH].
137. Interview with Brent Harris, Head of Strategic Initiatives (Governance Team), Facebook, in
Menlo Park, Cal. (June 6, 2019) (describing how building the Governance Team started in
January 2018).
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people a voice in the process is another essential component of building a fair
system.”138 That month in an interview with Vox’s Ezra Klein, Zuckerberg stated:
You can imagine some sort of structure, almost like a Supreme Court,
that is made up of independent folks who don’t work for Facebook, who
ultimately make the final judgment call on what should be acceptable
speech in a community that reflects the social norms and values of people
all around the world.139
Seven months later, Zuckerberg made the announcement official. In “A Blue-
print for Content Governance and Enforcement,” the CEO acknowledged that
he “increasingly [has] come to believe that Facebook should not make so many
important decisions about free expression and safety on [its] own.”140 Though
he did not call it a Supreme Court, Zuckerberg described the creation of an in-
dependent oversight committee that would help govern content.141 In creating
such a committee, Zuckerberg promised to listen to outside advice on a host of
difficult questions:
This is an incredibly important undertaking—and we’re still in the early
stages of defining how this will work in practice. Starting today, we’re
beginning a consultation period to address the hardest questions, such
as: how are members of the body selected? How do we ensure their in-
dependence from Facebook, but also their commitment to the principles
they must uphold? How do people petition this body? How does the
body pick which cases to hear from potentially millions of requests?142
The statement closed with an aggressive goal: that such an independent body
would be researched and created by the end of 2019.143
The thorny questions Zuckerberg posed in his statement were just a small
sample of the many difficult problems to be addressed in creating the Oversight
Board. Over the course of the next sixteen months, a small but steadily growing
team of people inside Facebook worked on finding answers to them. This Part
138. Bickert, supra note 14.
139. Klein, supra note 15.
140. Zuckerberg, supra note 16.
141. See evelyn douek, Facebook’s New ‘Supreme Court’ Could Revolutionize Online Speech, LAWFARE
(Nov. 19, 2018, 3:09 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/facebooks-new-supreme-court
-could-revolutionize-online-speech [https://perma.cc/F3XY-PGQ8].
142. Zuckerberg, supra note 16.
143. Id.
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describes the institution-building process of creating the Oversight Board. Sec-
tion II.A discusses the Board’s conceptual development: the global consultation
process, its mechanics, and the resultant report on its findings published by Fa-
cebook in June 2019. Given the input from this consultancy, Section II.B de-
scribes how the team then made decisions and tradeoffs in designing the Board
and writing its founding documents, culminating in the publication of the
Board’s Charter in the fall of 2019. Finally, Section II.C discusses the implemen-
tation of the Trust and Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) to insulate the Board
and the publication of the Bylaws, which detail the procedural mechanisms of
the Board. This descriptive account lays the groundwork for Part III’s normative
assessment of the Board’s impact on users, industry, governments, and global
free expression.
A. Phase I: Global Consultation and Recruiting
In January 2019, Facebook’s Vice President of Global Affairs and Communi-
cations, Nick Clegg, followed up on Zuckerberg’s November 2018 announce-
ment with specifics about how the Board would operate, what its potential scope
might be, and a draft of its Charter.144 Clegg’s post also detailed the timeline and
mechanisms by which Facebook would run the first phase of its process of cre-
ating the Board. This “Global Consultation” process would reach out to stake-
holders and users worldwide to survey what people thought the Oversight Board
should look like, accomplish, and address. It would take place over the first two
quarters of 2019 and include a series of workshops hosted by Facebook to “con-
vene experts and organizations who work on a range of issues such as free ex-
pression, technology and democracy, procedural fairness and human rights.”145
These workshops were to be held in Singapore, Delhi, Nairobi, Berlin, New
York, and Mexico City, but in an effort to not “hand-pick[]” a small group of
global experts, Clegg detailed that additional outreach efforts would take place
in other ways, such as by small group consultation, individual meetings, and a
public portal for submitting proposals about the Board.146
Reaction to Zuckerberg’s and Clegg’s announcements was mixed. Some wor-
ried that an Oversight Board would not only create more of the same types of
144. Nick Clegg, Charting a Course for an Oversight Board for Content Decisions, FACEBOOK NEWS-
ROOM (Jan. 28, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2019/01/oversight-board [https://
perma.cc/Q998-VPUA].
145. Id.
146. See id.; see also Email from Zoe Darmé, Member, Governance Team, Facebook, to author
(Sept. 14, 2019, 16:59 EST) (on file with author) (listing the exact dates of workshops and
other workshop locations).
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censorship of user speech—particularly “borderline” content—but also provide
a show of self-governance that would block governments from regulating Face-
book.147 Others were less concerned with borderline speech decisions and in-
stead saw the Oversight Board as a public-relations gambit that might never be-
come a reality or, if it did, would be more soundbite than substance.148 Cynically,
there was also the realization that, should such an independent body come to
fruition, the Board would reflect not the noble aim of creating accountability and
responsible governance that so many had called for, but Facebook’s best inter-
ests.149 Specifically, some worried that having an independent body set some of
Facebook’s most contentious and high-impact policies might end up serving as
a scapegoat, allowing the platform to divert responsibility in the face of negative
public reactions.150
Before discussing the external consultation phase, it is useful to have an idea
of what was happening internally at Facebook during those first six months. Be-
fore Zuckerberg publicly announced the creation of the Board in November 2018,
Facebook had already begun to hire a team to make the idea a reality.151 This
team came to be called the Governance and Strategic Initiatives Team, or Gov-
ernance Team.152 Its director was a young consultant, Brent Harris, who was
hired from outside Facebook in January 2018.153 The Governance team led by
147. See, e.g., Dipayan Ghosh, Facebook’s Oversight Board Is Not Enough, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 16,
2019), https://hbr.org/2019/10/facebooks-oversight-board-is-not-enough [https://
perma.cc/LYJ4-TP8C]; Color of Change: Facebook Retaliated Against Protests by Pushing Anti-
Semitic, Anti-Black Narratives, DEMOCRACYNOW (Nov. 16, 2018), https://
www.democracynow.org/2018/11/16/color_of_change_facebook_retaliated_against
[https://perma.cc/DVK4-ECJS] (transcript of interview of Siva Vaidhyanathan about the
Oversight Board).
148. See, e.g., Conor Friedersdorf, The Speech That Facebook Plans to Punish, ATLANTIC (Dec.
11, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/12/facebook-punish-censorship
/577654 [https://perma.cc/VWW8-TCBS]; Zeynep Tufekci, Why Zuckerberg’s 14-Year Apol-
ogy Tour Hasn’t Fixed Facebook, WIRED (Apr. 6, 2018, 3:32 PM), https://www.wired.com
/story/why-zuckerberg-15-year-apology-tour-hasnt-fixed-facebook [https://perma.cc
/9ZVB-527Y].
149. See, e.g., Josh Constine, Toothless: Facebook Proposes a Weak Oversight Board, TECHCRUNCH
(Jan. 28, 2020, 4:33 PM EST), https://techcrunch.com/2020/01/28/under-consideration
[https://perma.cc/523P-L3UR].
150. Id.
151. Email from Carolyn Glanville, Policy Communications (Governance Board), Facebook, to au-
thor (Sept. 19, 2019, 9:04 PM EST) (on file with author) (listing the team members’ start
dates and their previous roles); see also Interview with Brent Harris, supra note 137 (describing
his own start on the team in January 2018).
152. Email from Carolyn Glanville, supra note 151.
153. Id.
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Harris has around ten direct employees as well as dozens of “cross-functional”
employees, who work on the Governance Team and in other areas of Face-
book.154 Harris and the Governance Team report to Clegg, who in turn reports
directly to Zuckerberg.155 At Facebook, a company that thickly layers its man-
agement, having only one reporting level between the Governance Team and
Zuckerberg implied a major commitment to the project.
Within the Governance Team, work on building the Board was initially split
into four “tracks”—or “subject focuses.”156 Track 1 focused on the selection of the
Board members. While information about what users wanted an Oversight
Board to look like was gathered from the consultancy process, those involved
with Track 1 prepped the back end of the selection process. Working with outside
consultants, they developed a list of qualities desired in Board members, a vet-
ting procedure for candidates, and a process by which users could “nominate”
members.157 Track 2’s role was to decide on the powers, scope, and structure of
the Board, which would be laid out in the founding documents.158 One of the
most difficult aspects was how to build a sufficiently independent adjudicatory
body to provide oversight for Facebook, if Facebook was the creator of that
Board. This problem arose in even basic questions of procedure, such as how the
Board should review content decision cases. As one Team member described:
Let’s start with . . . how Facebook will present those cases to the Board,
so what kind of information is in the cases, how much information we
give[] them, what is their basis of the review of the decision, are we ask-
ing them to do a de novo review or is it in deference to Facebook’s earlier
decision, . . . how are the panels selected that finally hear the cases, are
we going for regional diversity, are we going for more of a global
panel . . . [t]hen the deliberation process, what are the timelines—how
154. See Email from Carolyn Glanville, Policy Communications (Governance Board), Facebook, to
author (May 25, 2020, 9:09 PM EST) (on file with author).
155. See Kurt Wagner, Facebook Found Its New Public Face: Former U.K. Deputy Prime Minister Nick
Clegg, VOX (Oct. 19, 2018, 11:32 AM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/19/17999968
/facebook-nick-clegg-hire-deputy-prime-minister-elliot-schrage [https://perma.cc/2LDB
-76FH]; Email from Carolyn Glanville, supra note 154.
156. Interview with Kristen Murdock, Abigail Bridgman, McKenzie Thomas, and Emily Terwelp,
Members of Governance Team, Facebook, in Menlo Park, Cal. (June 3, 2019) (describing the
different tracks of “members, decisions, support, and go to market”).
157. Interview with Fariba Yassaee and McKenzie Thomas, Members of Governance Team, Face-
book in Menlo Park, Cal. (June 5, 2019) (describing the purpose of Track 1).
158. Interview with Kristen Murdock et al., supra note 156 (describing the purpose of Track 2).
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long does the case move from the time it is sourced, selected, to hearing
and deliberation and how does that work.159
Track 3 dealt with the administrative side of the Board, setting up the secre-
tariat to staff the Board, creating a framework to research and give local context
on an appeal to the Board through outside experts, designing the “tooling that
the Board is going to need, functionally, to be able to sift through the volume of
cases,” which included how the Board would be able to interact with Facebook
while retaining independence.160 Perhaps most saliently, the major task of Track
3 was to tackle the issue of governance:
[H]ow will the Board govern itself? What is the Board set up function-
ally to do as [it relates to] the Charter? How does the Board govern itself
from a governance perspective in its Bylaws? And . . . how does that all
work together to create the institution that is the Board and its staff?161
The fourth and final Track was the “go to market” team, tasked with imple-
menting everything decided in Tracks 1, 2, and 3.162 This team focused on the
launch of the Oversight Board, from creating a curriculum for training its mem-
bers to having a flagship event that could both orient and welcome the Board.163
While these Tracks worked internally at Facebook, a separate outreach team
prepared to launch the global consulting process and interface between Facebook
and the public.164 This meant designing and planning the six global workshops.
Crucially for user participation, it also involved inviting participants and collect-
ing feedback. User participation was not limited to these workshops, however.
The outreach team also met one-on-one with experts who could not attend the
workshops, created one-day workshops for small groups of stakeholders, and
constructed an online portal to solicit feedback from all global users.165
159. Id. (quoting Abigail Bridgman).
160. Interview with Heather Moore and McKenzie Thomas, Members of Governance Team, Face-
book in Menlo Park, Cal. (June 5, 2019) (describing the purpose of Track 3).
161. Id. (quoting Heather Moore).
162. Interview with Kristen Murdock et al., supra note 156.
163. Interview with Zoe Darmé, McKenzie Thomas, and Fariba Yassaee, Members of Governance
Team, Facebook in Menlo Park, Cal. (June 4, 2019) (discussing syncing outreach and member
recruiting with Track 4); Interview with Fariba Yassaee, Kendall, Greg, and Eric, Members of
Governance Team, Facebook in Menlo Park, Cal. (June 4, 2019) (discussing organization and
planning of member training).
164. Email from Carolyn Glanville, supra note 151.
165. Interview with Zoe Darmé et al., supra note 163; Interview with Zoe Darmé and McKenzie
Thomas, Members, Governance Team, Facebook, in Berlin, Ger. (June 24, 2019).
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The first Global Workshop took place in Singapore on February 20 and 21,
2019.166 The decision to start in the Global South was a purposeful one, said one
member of the team, since “the rules for Facebook had always come from an
American and Western tradition, which was part of the problem. We wanted to
do our best to anchor ourselves to the concerns of people that were outside that
culture.”167 But at the first workshop, both sides had no idea what to plan for or
expect. Facebook had invited around forty people and had not organized a
presentation or structure for the discussion. “I figured they would just tell us
what they thought of the Board,” said one organizer, “but it turns out they
showed up expecting to be told what the Board was, or might be, and they had
no idea how to give feedback without that.”168 The result was a retooling of the
format for the following day’s meetings that included an introduction for work-
shop participants about the Board’s purpose and a set of group exercises.
The format developed in Singapore became the standard programming for
all global workshops going forward.169 At each event, forty to fifty invited stake-
holders, experts, and journalists convened over the course of two days. Partici-
pants were assigned seats around a nine-person table. At each seat was an iPad
that was pre-loaded with case-study documents and the Facebook Community
Standards. After a morning introduction to content moderation and the Over-
sight Board, the remainder of the two days was spent addressing two hypothet-
ical cases that the Board might see. In these simulations, each workshop table
was a notional Oversight Board “panel.” Participants were asked to read the “case
for review,” and then, using the Community Standards as a guide, discuss with
their group whether the content should stay up or come down. Tables voted in-
dividually and then a full-group poll was taken, followed by discussion. As the
workshops moved around the globe—Delhi later in February, Nairobi in March,
Mexico City and New York City in May, and Berlin in June—the outreach team
for Facebook gathered careful notes from the conversations, polls, and group
breakout sessions.170
In addition to these larger forums, the outreach team also organized a series
of smaller roundtables to reach communities and groups of experts that could
not attend the Global Workshops. The first of these occurred before the an-
nouncement of the Board and was held at Facebook. It included legal scholars,
166. Email from Zoe Darmé, supra note 146.
167. Interview with Zoe Darmé and McKenzie Thomas, supra note 165.
168. Id. (quoting McKenzie Thomas).
169. Id.
170. Email from Zoe Darmé, supra note 146.
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human-rights experts, and technical specialists at Facebook headquarters in Oc-
tober 2018.171 Similar one-day stakeholder events were held all over the world,
ranging from Taipei to Washington, D.C. to Istanbul, and even one town hall in
Norman, Oklahoma. 172 In total, 650 people from eighty-eight countries at-
tended the workshops, roundtables, and town halls.173 Moreover, 1,206 people
participated in the online questionnaire about the Board that was open to the
public for responses between April 1 and May 27, 2019.174
User participation in determining what the Board should be was not the only
goal of the Global Consultancy process. The events also served as potential
sources of recruitment of members for the Board.175 A Facebook employee, often
from the Governance Team, oversaw the simulations at each table. As partici-
pants deliberated, Facebook employees looked for various qualities and attrib-
utes that early research in member selection had deemed relevant: was a partic-
ipant open to changing their mind through conversation;176 did a participant
listen to others; did a participant express good insight into a particular issue;
171. Telephone Interview with Robert Post, Professor, Yale Law School (Feb. 28, 2020) (discussing
his attendance at the meeting and describing participants and nature of discussion).
172. Interview with Zoe Darmé, Peter Stern, and McKenzie Thomas, Facebook, in Menlo Park,
Cal. (June 7, 2019); Brent Harris, Global Feedback and Input on the Facebook Oversight Board for
Content Decisions, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 27, 2019), https://newsroom.fb.com/news
/2019/06/global-feedback-on-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/946H-ZM6A]; see also Zoe
Mentel Darmé et al., Global Feedback & Input on the Facebook Oversight Board for Content Deci-
sions, FACEBOOK 41 (June 27, 2019), https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/06
/oversight-board-consultation-report-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC7U-GCD8] [hereinafter
Facebook Consultancy Report]; Global Feedback & Input on the Facebook Oversight Board for
Content Decisions: Appendix, FACEBOOK, https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/06
/oversight-board-consultation-report-appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/3UN7-S8ZD] [here-
inafter Facebook Consultancy Report Appendices].
173. Facebook Consultancy Report, supra note 172, at 12. There was also one-on-one consultation
with more than 250 people about the Oversight Board, but little has been made available about
how those people were sourced, paid, or how their feedback influenced the creation of the
Board.
174. The survey was available in thirteen languages and had quantitative and qualitative elements.
The first part was a series of multiple-choice questions about the Charter, while the second
part consisted of open essay-style questions about who should serve on the Board, how the
Board should hear cases and deliberate, and what governance structure would result in the
most independent outcomes. See id. at 15.
175. Interview with Zoe Darmé et al., supra note 163.
176. This particular metric was also quantitatively measured. Before deliberating with their table,
participants were asked to use the application on their iPad to vote on whether they would
keep up or remove content. After a few hours of deliberation, they were asked to vote again.
Email from Zoe Darmé, Member, Governance Team, Facebook (June 18, 2019, 11:15 PM EST)
(on file with author).
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how did a participant deal with opinions hostile to their own?177 While nomina-
tions of people to serve on the Board came through a variety of means, including
an online public portal, the workshops provided critical feedback as the Govern-
ance Team moved into the membership selection phase. By the conclusion of the
process, the Governance Team ran outreach on and sought feedback from well
over two thousand individuals around the world, making it perhaps one of the
largest global recruitment and stakeholder participation processes in history.
The results of the Global Consultancy were published in a forty-four-page
executive report with a 180-page appendix on June 27, 2019.178 As one might ex-
pect from such an extensive global survey, there was no clear consensus on what
users wanted from an Oversight Board, but a few trends emerged.179 For in-
stance, the majority of those who gave feedback agreed that a set of substantive
values should underpin the Charter and purpose of the Board, though there was
significant disagreement about what those values should be.180 Respondents
also strongly favored the Board having the ability to influence policy, with
ninety-five percent of respondents favoring the idea that the Board could make
policy recommendations to Facebook.181 Finally, while many felt that diversity
should be a major priority for the Board and the people working for it, there was
little unanimity about how to implement that idea on a global scale.182
These results, while scattered, provided a number of signals about what val-
ues and principles to aim for as the Governance Team turned to the next phase:
drafting the Charter of the Oversight Board.
B. Phase II: Structure and Design
In early January 2019, a draft Charter was announced, listing some of the big
questions that would have to be addressed by the final document.183 The Over-
sight Board Charter was imagined as, and ultimately became, a constitution-like
177. Interview with Brent Harris, supra note 137; Interview with Fariba Yassaee et al., supra note
163.
178. See Facebook Consultancy Report, supra note 172.
179. douek & Klonick, supra note 52.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Draft Charter: An Oversight Board for Content Decisions, FACEBOOK, https://about.fb.com/wp
-content/uploads/2019/01/draft-charter-oversight-board-for-content-decisions-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KL7H-2RUD].
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document that laid out the structural relationship between Facebook, the Over-
sight Board, and the Trust that would sit between them. On September 17, 2019,
the Governance Team released the final Charter.184 The nine-page foundational
document was split into seven articles: Members, Authority to Review, Proce-
dures for Review, Implementation, Governance, Amendments and Bylaws, and
Compliance with Law.185 This Section examines those provisions while adding
context from interviews and observations at Facebook while the decisions were
being made. It discusses four broad areas that involve the interplay of all provi-
sions: Board Composition, Selection, and Removal of Members; Board Author-
ity and Power; Appellate Procedure; and Structural Independence.
1. Board Composition, Selection, and Removal of Members
From the beginning of the Oversight Board project, once certain structural
decisions were made, the final core question would be who Board members were
and how they were selected.186 This included substantive questions about what
qualifications members should possess and whom they should represent, as well
as procedural problems about how members would be chosen and removed.187
Feedback from the consulting period established that people overwhelm-
ingly favored a diverse Board that represented “as many segments of society as
possible” and incorporated a “multidisciplinary, multi-stakeholder approach.”188
The discussion of what diversity meant was lengthy and included discussions
about gender, race, sexual orientation, geographic location, education, age, dis-
ability, wealth, and political views.189 Additionally, much time was spent on
members’ necessary experience and qualifications. Many felt that Board mem-
bers should be drawn from elite sectors of the global population, while others
184. Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent Oversight Board, FACE-
BOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 17, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/oversight-board
-structure [https://perma.cc/BY6N-JAB8].
185. Oversight Board Charter, FACEBOOK, https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09
/oversight_board_charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/H53N-PHP4].
186. Interview with Brent Harris, supra note 137.
187. Interview with Fariba Yassaee, Member, Governance Team, Facebook, in Menlo Park, Cal.
(Aug. 8, 2019); Interview with Heather Moore, Brent Harris, and Louis Chang, Members of
Governance Team, Facebook, in Menlo Park, Cal. (Sept. 11, 2019); Observation at Charter
Workshop for Outside Stakeholders, Facebook, in Menlo Park, Cal. (Aug. 8, 2019) (Chatham
House Rule discussion around risks of various Board selection mechanisms).
188. Facebook Consultancy Report, supra note 172, at 20.
189. Id. at 19-20.
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“stress[ed] that the Board ‘doesn’t need people with public profiles.’”190 Feed-
back on subject-matter expertise of Board members generally fell into two
camps: those who felt Board members should be versed in a specific subject mat-
ter like human rights, freedom of expression, law, or technology, and those who
favored requiring more general decision-making expertise.191
The final decision in the Charter of how to balance professional qualifica-
tions and diversity pointed toward an adjudicatory rather than a representative
model:
[M]embers must possess and exhibit a broad range of knowledge, com-
petencies, diversity, and expertise . . . [and] must have demonstrated ex-
perience at deliberating thoughtfully and as an open-minded contributor
on a team; be skilled at making and explaining decisions . . . ; and have fa-
miliarity with matters relating to digital content and governance, includ-
ing free expression, civic discourse, safety, privacy and technology.192
The Charter also instructs the Board to split into subsections, termed panels,
when reviewing cases.193 Conversations about the panels have operated on the
assumption that each will be comprised of five Board members, but the Charter
does not specify a number.194 The Charter does specify, however, that each panel
will contain “at least one member from the region” where the case arose.195
This decision to mandate a “local representative” was heavily debated. In
early June 2019, a cross-function meeting of over twenty people discussed the
feasibility of including a mandatory local member on each panel.196 “What do
we mean by local? One person from the [United States] can’t represent all of the
[United States]. So what do we mean? Does it have to be someone simply versed
in the cultural issues at stake?” asked one participant.197 Others worried about
190. Id. at 19.
191. Somewhat predictably, in subject-matter suggestions, respondents tended to strongly favor
the importance of people in their own area of expertise. For example, human-rights scholars
insisted that the Board be comprised primarily by those who were experts in human rights;
lawyers felt the board should be made up of lawyers or judges; and engineers and technolo-
gists deemed deep technical understanding necessary. See id.
192. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 1, § 2 (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Observation of Cross Function Meeting with Members of Governance Team, Facebook, in
Menlo Park, Cal. (June 5, 2019).
197. Id. (quoting Heather Moore).
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the impracticality of looping in a regional representative given the speed at which
decisions would have to be made. Finally, others emphasized that such concerns
were no different for geography than for any other cultural factors.198 By the end
of that June meeting, the idea of a local panel member seemed to be put aside,
but in early August it reemerged as a central element of the Charter.199 In follow-
up questions, a Governance Team member explained that the idea returned be-
cause it “was something we heard over and over again in talking to stakeholders.
It was really important to people.”200 The drafters imagined a “scale up” solution
to the problem of finding a regional panel member—defining the “region”
broadly—rather than a “scale down” solution that would attempt to find the per-
fect local representative for each case.201
The Charter also outlines the selection process for members. Initial selection
presented a chicken-and-egg problem. Though the Board could eventually self-
select, the question of how to select initial Board members was difficult. If Face-
book selected the initial Board, it undermined its goal of having the Board be
fully independent. A selection committee to choose the initial Board members
was also no solution, merely perpetuating the same problem of Facebook “se-
lecting the selectors.”202 Direct voting was not only practically infeasible across
languages and cultures, but also unlikely to lead to a productive outcome.203 Ul-
timately, the Governance Team decided that Facebook’s initial selection of mem-
bers was inevitable but endeavored to reduce its impact by selecting an initial
cadre, who would then select additional members. In an August workshop about
the Charter, a few experts expressed deep skepticism about this approach, argu-
198. Id.
199. Compare id. (describing consensus vote “leaning more towards not regional” representation
on panels), with Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 3, § 2.
200. Observation at Charter Workshop for Outside Stakeholders, supra note 187 (quoting Zoe
Darmé).
201. Id.; see also Oversight Board Bylaws, FACEBOOK (Jan. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-content
/uploads/2020/01/Bylaws_v6.pdf [https://perma.cc/JK4W-YGMK].
202. Interview with Zoe Darmé et al., supra note 163 (debating various methods of Board mem-
bership selection).
203. See, e.g., Katie Rogers, Boaty McBoatface: What You Get When You Let the Internet Decide, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/world/europe/boaty
-mcboatface-what-you-get-when-you-let-the-internet-decide.html [https://perma.cc
/YW52-AHZ5].
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ing that without more direction the Board would become “chaos” and that re-
search in this area showed that people are drawn to selecting “people most like
them,” thus threatening the Board’s diversity.204
Despite these concerns, the Charter announced that the initial Board would
be comprised of at least eleven members, with the potential to grow to “likely”
forty,205 and that Facebook would select the first Board members (“Co-Chairs”),
who would then work with Facebook to select the remaining members.206 Inter-
nally, the Governance Team referred to this as Phase 1, a period in which Face-
book had the most direct involvement in helping to vet and decide on Board
members.207 Phase 2 of member selection would begin after the official launch
of the Board and the selection of this initial group. Originally, it was imagined
that this process would be largely independent from Facebook, with the Board
Hiring Committee selecting “candidates to serve as board members based on a
review of the candidates’ qualifications,” and with recommendations for Board
members coming from Facebook and the public.208 Difficulty in selecting Board
members and delays have changed this dynamic.209 Phase 2 selection of Board
members actively involves Facebook and the partners hired to assist with vetting,
even though this is not mentioned in the Charter.210 Presumably, after the Board
reaches forty members, or Phase 3, Facebook’s role is planned to return to the
minimal one set out in the Charter.211
One of the final questions regarding Board composition was how a Board
member’s term would end. The Charter specifies that members will serve for
three-year terms, for a maximum of three terms.212 Outside this limitation, the
Charter states only that “trustees may remove a member before the expiration of
204. Observation at Charter Workshop for Outside Stakeholders, supra note 187; see generally LAU-
REN A. RIVERA, PEDIGREE: HOW ELITE STUDENTS GET ELITE JOBS (2015) (describing how elite
institutions seek out people from similarly privileged backgrounds).
205. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 1, § 1.
206. Id. art. 1, § 8. Trustee approval is necessary to officially appoint the members. Id.
207. Blue Jeans Interview with Fariba Yassaee, Member, Governance Team, Facebook (Mar. 6,
2020).
208. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 1, § 8.
209. Originally, the Board was slated to be announced one year from Zuckerberg’s announcement
of the project in December 2019, but this date was pushed back, first to January 2020, then to
March, then to May of that year. At this writing, the Board is expected to publicly announce
members in mid-May 2020. Implications of this are discussed in more detail infra Part III.
210. Blue Jeans Interview with Fariba Yassaee, supra note 207.
211. Id.
212. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 1, § 3.
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their term for violations of the code of conduct, but they may not remove a mem-
ber due to content decisions they have made.”213 The Charter does not specify a
process for removal.214 Generally, a detailed procedure on removal of govern-
ment members is a vital part of ensuring accountability in governance. 215
Though many in the Governance Team argued for a more detailed removal pro-
cess in the Charter, the ultimate decision was to place this process in the Bylaws.
2. Board Authority and Power
From the outset, the creation of an external independent Oversight Board
raised questions of authority and power. Which content would fall under the
Board’s purview and what power it might wield over Facebook were ever present
in the minds of the Governance Team and also of outside observers.216 When it
was released, the Charter was intentionally vague on many of these issues. In-
ternally, the Governance Team and those in higher positions were actively debat-
ing exactly what should fall under the Board’s jurisdiction, how cases would rise
to their attention, what principles would guide decision-making, and what Fa-
cebook’s responsibilities would be following a Board decision. The Charter’s fi-
nal language left many of these questions open, to be resolved by the Bylaws.217
The Charter set out a broad potential subject-matter jurisdiction for the
Board, mentioning little about what content would be eligible or ineligible for
review and primarily focusing on who could submit cases.218 Excluding content
213. Id. art. 1, § 8.
214. More details are made clear in the Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201.
215. For an excellent analysis of the power of removal clauses in federal systems, see Saikrishna
Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779 (2006).
216. This is particularly true of evelyn douek, who has analyzed the issue of the Board’s power
closely. For an excellent analysis, see evelyn douek, Facebook’s “Oversight Board:” Move Fast with
Stable Infrastructure and Humility, 21 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2019); evelyn douek, How Much
Power Did Facebook Give Its Oversight Board?, LAWFARE (Sept. 25, 2019, 8:47 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/how-much-power-did-facebook-give-its-oversight-board [https://
perma.cc/6ARB-QR99].
217. As will be discussed infra, the Bylaws sometimes limit the language of the Charter. Compare
Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 2, § 1, with Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201,
art. 2, § 1.2 (limiting and perhaps attempting to remove certain types of content from the
discretion of the Board). In conversations leading up to the final version of the Charter, many
Governance Team members struggled with balancing where to place specifics on scope and
authority, sometimes deciding after long discussions to resolve such issues in the Bylaws. In-
terview with Heather Moore et al., supra note 187.
218. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 2, § 1.
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that was removed in compliance with local laws219 and following an exhaustion
of appeals through Facebook, “a request for review can be submitted to the board
by either the original poster of the content or a person who previously submitted
the content to Facebook for review.”220 This statement is significant, as it implies
that the Board has the authority to review not only content that is removed (“orig-
inal poster of the content”) but content that is kept up (“person who previously
submitted” content for review). As will be discussed later, this promise of re-
viewing removal and nonremoval of content is one that Facebook circumscribed
in later documents, but this commitment in the Charter should be a meaningful
point of leverage as the Board seeks to expand its powers in the future.
It is not only users who can seek redress with the Board. The Charter also
sets forth a mechanism by which Facebook itself can ask the Board to review
certain cases, “including additional questions related to the treatment of content
beyond whether the content should be allowed or removed completely.”221 The
Board will have the ability to refuse Facebook’s requests for review, just as it has
the “discretion to choose which requests it will review and decide upon.”222 But
the Charter also imagines a specialized process in which Facebook can get an
“automatic and expedited review” in the case of “exceptional circumstances, in-
cluding when content could result in urgent real world consequences.”223
Once the Board selects a case for review, the question becomes which docu-
ments and principles will guide the decision. The Charter determines that Board
members should “review content decisions and determine whether they were
consistent with Facebook’s content policies and values.” Facebook’s Values, up-
dated in August 2019, balance “voice” with four secondary concerns: safety, pri-
vacy, authenticity, and dignity.224 Content policies refer mainly to Facebook’s
Community Standards. The Charter also specifies that any prior decisions by the
Board on a piece of content will have “highly persuasive” precedential value.225
Substantial debate took place within the Governance Team around how binding
the Board’s decisions should be on the Board itself. Many were concerned that
creating a binding precedential structure would limit the Board, while others
219. Id. art. 7.
220. Id. art. 2, §1.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. art. 3, § 7.2.
224. See Bickert, supra note 7.
225. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 2, § 2.
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worried that not establishing a strong preference for precedential decisions could
damage consistency and fairness.226
A final question related to the authority of the Board concerns Facebook’s
obligations in reacting to Board decisions. As to a decision on any single piece of
content, the Charter states that the Board’s decision is “binding” and “Facebook
will implement it promptly, unless implementation of a resolution could violate
the law.”227 This obligation is strictly limited to the precise piece of content de-
cided upon and the decision is not binding on any identical or similar content.
Additionally, the Charter indicates that policy recommendations by the Board
are “advisory” on Facebook, and that Facebook must “transparently communi-
cat[e] about actions taken as a result.”228 This latter obligation to respond to the
Board’s policy recommendations creates a weak-form review over Facebook that
could potentially become powerful by creating a public system of accountabil-
ity.229
3. Appellate Procedure
The section of the Charter that highlights the procedural process for Board
review sheds little light on what it will ultimately look like from the user per-
spective, something better accomplished by the Bylaws that were published a
few months later. Rather than lay out any specific procedures, the Charter in-
stead introduces broad guarantees. These include various commitments not only
to transparency230 but also to privacy and confidentiality.231 The Charter, fur-
thermore, gives direction on the number of members needed to reach a decision
(a majority, though consensus is encouraged) and what a panel should include
in its written decision.232 It also introduces the administrative operation of the
Board, which will encompass full-time staff to “support” the Board, including
226. Observation at Charter Workshop for Outside Stakeholders, supra note 187.
227. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 4.
228. Id.
229. See douek, LAWFARE, supra note 216. See generally MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG
RIGHTS (2008); Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Judicial Review and American Exceptionalism
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 348, 2011), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1833743 [https://perma.cc/SSE3-KA3V].
230. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 3, § 6 (committing to publicly communicate Board
decisions on a website and database).
231. Id. art. 3, §§ 2-3 (describing panels as anonymous and discussing development of case files in
keeping with privacy and legal restrictions).
232. Id. art. 3, § 4.
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“reviewing case submissions and coordinating outside research and statements
for selected cases.”233
4. Independence Through Structure and a Binding Charter
One of the most frequent recommendations from the Global Consultancy
period was to ensure the Board’s independence from Facebook. The extent to
which this recommendation was implemented will be evaluated in Part III. This
Section aims only to describe the commitments in the Charter related to that
goal. These commitments include the discretion given to the Board in case and
member selection, the governance relationship between the Oversight Board, the
Trust, and Facebook, and the structure around Charter amendments.
The ability of the Board to set its own docket is an essential part of its intel-
lectual independence as an oversight body. Just as it would be problematic for,
say, the U.S. Department of Justice to determine the Supreme Court’s case selec-
tion, Facebook’s ability to direct which cases the Board hears would create an
obvious conflict, given that Facebook is the defendant in all actions before the
Board.234 To avoid such conflict, the Charter states that the Board will select its
cases from those appealed by users.235 However, the Charter also envisions “Spe-
cial Procedures” in “exceptional circumstances” wherein the Board would “auto-
matic[ally]” review a case at Facebook’s request.236
A second fundamental part of the Board’s intellectual independence is its
ability to select its membership. The Charter states that after the announcement
of initial members, the remaining members will be selected internally by the
Board.237 But as previously discussed,238 the selection process of the initial co-
hort of members has increasingly been handled by Facebook. It is unclear if this
precedent of Facebook’s initial involvement will forever taint the process and put
in place long-term mechanisms that compromise members’ ability to fairly ad-
judicate.
233. Id. art. 3, § 1.
234. Facebook could shield itself from scrutiny through control of the Board’s docket. See, e.g.,
Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 318-26
(1999); Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for Certification?,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310, 1310-12 (2010).
235. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 2, § 1.
236. Id. art. 3, § 7.
237. Id. art. 1, § 4; Blue Jeans Interview with Fariba Yassaee, supra note 207.
238. See supra Section II.B.1.
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Regarding the governance relationship between the Oversight Board, Trust,
and Facebook, the Charter states that the “board, the trust and Facebook will
work together to fulfill the charter and the board’s purpose.”239 The Board is to
“review content and issue reasoned, public decisions within the bounds of this
charter . . . [and] provide advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies.”240
The Trust is to fund the Board’s budget and appoint and remove members.241
And Facebook is to “commit to the board’s independent oversight on content
decisions and the implementation of those decisions,” funding the Trust, and
appointing trustees. 242 Moreover, it is to “contract for services” with the
Board.243 The Charter thus assigns Facebook a broad but vague role.
Finally, the Charter promotes independence by giving the Board a role in the
process of amending the Charter. Amendment, according to the Charter, re-
quires the approval of a majority of the individual trustees, a majority of the
Board, and the agreement of Facebook.244 The decision to include Facebook in
the amendment process is problematic. On the one hand, it addresses practical
concerns: the Board and the Trust might otherwise decide to amend aspects of
the Charter in ways that are practically or legally infeasible for Facebook. On the
other hand, the necessity to procure Facebook’s agreement could prevent any
meaningful amendment from taking place. Moreover, Facebook’s amendment
power is magnified by the fact that two influential documents lie outside the
Board’s control: the Community Standards and the substantive Values that un-
derlie them. The Charter binds the Board to interpret these documents, and it is
unclear what would happen if Facebook were to unilaterally alter them. Presum-
ably, the Board would be beholden to Facebook’s changing guidelines.
C. Phase III: Implementation
In the final stages of drafting the Charter, as details were removed and the
document became increasingly high-level, members of the Governance Team
started describing the role of the document as “putting a stake in the ground.”245
The phase implied a metaphor that once “land” was claimed, details of use, own-
ership, or possession could be filled in later. Similarly, the role of the Charter was
239. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 5.
240. Id. art. 5, § 1.
241. Id. art. 5, § 2.
242. Id.
243. Id. art. 5, § 1.
244. Id. art. 6, § 1.
245. Interview with Heather Moore et al., supra note 187 (quoting Heather Moore).
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to stake out the core principles, with the rest to come later.246 Accordingly, fol-
lowing the release of the Charter in mid-September 2019, the Governance Team
began crafting the final founding documents and implementations that would
support the Board and provide greater detail on processes and relationships be-
tween the three parties. This Section looks at the documents creating the Trust
and the irrevocable grant to the Trust; the Bylaws and Code of Conduct; and the
start of the administrative side of the Oversight Board.
1. The Trust
To be meaningfully independent, the Oversight Board must, at a minimum,
have financial independence from Facebook. This point was frequently men-
tioned during the Global Consultancy period.247 According to the Global Con-
sultancy Report, “the most common suggestion in this regard was the establish-
ment of a separate trust, endowment or foundation.”248 The Governance Team
adopted this suggestion and publicly announced in mid-September 2019 that it
would create “an independent trust.”249 Work on the Trust had begun months
earlier, as members of the Team worked with outside consultants and Facebook’s
legal division to develop a Trust agreement and create a beneficiary for the
Trust—the Oversight Board and an LLC, both independent entities. On October
16, 2019, Team members traveled to Delaware to meet with the Corporate Trus-
tee, Brown Brothers Harriman, to sign the final documents and make the Trust
and Oversight Board LLC official.250 These documents were released to the pub-
lic on December 12, 2019, alongside an announcement that Facebook had made
an “initial commitment of $130 million” to support the Board’s operational costs
and allow it to “operate for at least its first two full terms, approximately 6
years.”251
246. Id.
247. Facebook Consultancy Report, supra note 172, at 31.
248. Id.
249. Harris, supra note 184.
250. Limited Liability Company Agreement: Oversight Board LLC, FACEBOOK (Oct. 17, 2019), https://
about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/LLC-Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDW3
-JXFM] [hereinafter Oversight Board LLC Agreement]; Oversight Board Trust, FACEBOOK
(Oct. 16, 2019), https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Trust-Agreement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P82R-QHQS] [hereinafter Oversight Board Trust Agreement].
251. Brent Harris, An Update on Building a Global Oversight Board, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 12,
2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/12/oversight-board-update [https://perma.cc
/W925-J84G].
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According to the Trust Agreement, the Trust’s stated purpose “is to facilitate
the creation, funding, management, and oversight of a structure that will permit
and protect the operation of an Oversight Board.”252 To fulfill this purpose, the
Trust funds the Oversight Board LLC, which will “establish, administer and at-
tend to the ongoing operation” of the Board.253 In addition to the Corporate
Trustees, there will be between three and eleven Individual Trustees, all ap-
pointed by Facebook.254 Trustees are slated to serve five-year terms255 with an-
nual compensation of $200,000.256 Over two pages are devoted to tenure, re-
view, removal, and resignation of Individual Trustees or Corporate Trustees, but
none of these procedures empower any such actions by the Oversight Board it-
self.257
As a corporate legal document, the Oversight Board Trust Agreement is
anything but boilerplate. It rests the core powers of Trustee appointment with
Facebook, which might compromise the Trust’s independence. But specific pro-
visions do seem to empower Trustees. Section 2.2, for instance, states that a “vital
role of the Trust by its Individual Trustees is to protect the independent judg-
ment of the Board Members and their ability to fulfill their stated purpose.”258 It
further declares that Facebook “has relinquished its authority over the Trust ex-
cept with respect to key provisions . . . and under exceptional circumstances as a
way to protect the Purpose and avoid frustrating the independent judgment of
the Board.”259 The Agreement also gives the Trust the power to form compa-
nies.260 This provision might allow the Trust and the Board to create new inde-
pendent bodies as long as those entities serve the Board’s goals. Finally, the
Agreement makes an irrevocable grant to the Trust through the Trust Estate.261
The Governance Team had long debated the exact structure of how to fund the
Trust, weighing two clear but extremely different options.262 The Trust could be
252. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, § 2.1.
253. Id.
254. Id. §§ 6.1-6.2.
255. Id. § 6.2.2(b).
256. Id. § 6.7.
257. Id. § 6.2.
258. Id. § 2.2.
259. Id.
260. Id. § 4.6.
261. Id. § 1.4.
262. Blue Jeans Interview with Heather Moore and Louis Chang, Members of Governance Team,
Facebook (Mar. 4, 2020) (describing retrospectively the tradeoffs in how to structure the fi-
nancial and corporate entities of the Board and Trust).
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funded annually by Facebook, which would force Trustees to come back on a
yearly basis for funding. This would allow annual assessment of the Board and
its efficacy, but it might also harm the Board’s financial independence. At the
other extreme, the Governance Team discussed creating an investible endow-
ment at the outset, allowing the Trust and the Board to be self-funding so they
could run in perpetuity.263 This second proposal would have eliminated the
Trust’s financial dependence on Facebook but could have created the problem of
creating an indelible source of funding for potentially nothing, if the Board were
not to succeed. The final decision was somewhere in the middle: the Trust would
be funded with an irrevocable grant of $130 million, enough to fund operations
for two terms or approximately six years.264
Released alongside the Trust Agreement was the Oversight Board Limited
Liability Agreement, which formally incorporated the Board as an LLC.265 Much
of the LLC Agreement rehashed the Charter’s provisions about Board members’
powers, but it also detailed the administrative side of the Board, creating, for
instance, a Director of the Oversight Board. The Director is empowered to enter
into service agreements and contracts on behalf of the Board; employ staff; pro-
vide for office, company, and Board member expenses; direct members’ com-
pensation; and dictate the provisions of members’ contracts.266 The provision of
a Director of Administration added a new intermediary in the relationship be-
tween the Trustees and Board.
2. The Bylaws
The Bylaws, announced on January 28, 2020, were the Board’s final founding
document.267 The Bylaws are split into four articles detailing the relationship be-
tween Facebook, the Trust, the Oversight Board, and the People who will be able
to appeal through the Board. 268 The addition of “People” was significant.
Though users were ostensibly the impetus for the Board and were the concern
of most Governance Team deliberations, almost all of the founding documents
263. Id.
264. Harris, supra note 251.
265. Oversight Board LLC Agreement, supra note 250.
266. Id. art. 5.
267. Brent Harris, Preparing the Way Forward for Facebook’s Oversight Board, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/facebooks-oversight-board [https://
perma.cc/R6JM-ZV5K]. Included in the same document as the Bylaws is the Board’s Code of
Conduct. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, at Code of Conduct. The appointment of
Thomas Hughes as the Director of the Oversight Board was also announced with the Bylaws.
Harris, supra.
268. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201.
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focused on defining the powers and relationship of only the Board, the Trust,
and Facebook. The Bylaws, for the first time, introduced and clearly defined the
rights of users under the Board. This Section focuses on what the Bylaws mean
for users seeking appeal through the Board. Moreover, it highlights the input
that Facebook can seek from the Board. It concludes by discussing the levels of
transparency in both procedure and reporting, and by reviewing the avenues of
amending the founding documents.
a. User Appeal
According to the Charter, the Board can review a broad swath of content, but
while the Bylaws reiterate the Charter’s language,269 they also create many ex-
ceptions to the Board’s scope of review. At the Board’s launch, only single-ob-
ject270 removals271 of organic content272 posted on Facebook and Instagram are
eligible for review.273 Within that, content decisions “pursuant to legal obliga-
tions,” including those having to do with intellectual property, Facebook mar-
ketplace, fundraisers, Facebook dating, messages, and spam, are out of the
scope.274 The Bylaws do, however, envision a broadening of this scope, stating
that “[i]n the future, people will have the opportunity to request the board’s re-
view of other enforcement actions,”275 but these too are limited to specific areas
that will become appealable, including pages, profiles, groups, events, advertis-
ing, and content that Facebook reviews and “ultimately allow[s] to remain on
the platform.”276
269. Id. art. 3, § 1; Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 4.
270. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 3, § 1. The most fundamental type of organic user-
generated content is a post of a photo, video, or status message—internally referred to as
“simple objects.” This type of content can be contrasted with “complex objects,” such as a user
profile, group, or page, which involve many layers of user interaction and differing levels of
privacy. At launch, complex objects are not appealable to the Board.
271. As discussed in Section II.B, supra, the language of the Charter in art. 2, § 1 was read as creat-
ing rights of appeal for both users whose content was erroneously removed and users whose
request of removal was denied. At launch, no “kept up” content will be appealable to the
Board.
272. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 3, § 1. Content comes from commercial advertising
or “organically” from users. Commercial content includes ads or paid prioritization of content.
273. WhatsApp, Messenger, Instagram Direct, and Oculus are specifically excluded. Id. art. 2, § 1.2.
274. Id.
275. Id. art. 3, § 1.1.
276. Id.
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The Bylaws also set out the following appeals process for content that falls
within the Board’s limited subject-matter jurisdiction. First, a user has to exhaust
Facebook’s internal appeals process. Once exhausted—and if the content stays
removed—a user can request an appeal to the Oversight Board. Doing so will
generate an “individualized identification number,”277 which must be copied
from Facebook and taken to the Oversight Board’s website.278 Entering that
number will generate a case submission to the Board. In addition to automati-
cally transferring the file about the removed content to the Board, users will be
able to submit additional information, such as an explanation of why they be-
lieve Facebook’s decision was incorrect, “why they believe the board should hear
their case,” and why the decision could impact other Facebook users.279 From the
moment Facebook makes its final decision, the user and Board have ninety days
to submit and process a review.280
The next stage of Board appeal primarily involves the administrative staff
and Case Selection Committee members. Staff members will prepare case sub-
missions, prioritizing cases according to the directions of the Case Selection
Committee.281 The Case Selection Committee, which is comprised of five Board
members, will then review those cases.282 A majority vote is necessary to move a
case to panel review.283 If a case is moved to panel review, both the user and Fa-
cebook are notified. 284 Then, a five-member panel is convened to hear the
case.285 Four members are randomly selected, and one will be a random Board
member from the region “which the content primarily affects.”286 Though all
members’ names will be public, panels will remain anonymous.287 In conducting
its review, the panel can seek input from outside sources or a “pool of outside
277. Id. art. 3, § 1.2.1.
278. Blue Jeans Interview with Fay Johnson, Member of Governance Team, Facebook (Sept. 17,
2019) (describing the reference ID generated for users on Facebook that must then be taken
to the Oversight Board site).
279. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 3, § 1.2.
280. Id. art. 1, § 3.
281. Id. art. 1, § 3.1.2.
282. Id. art. 1, § 3.1.3.
283. Id.
284. Id. at art. 1, § 3.1.6.
285. Id.
286. Id. The Bylaws specify that these regions are the United States and Canada; Latin America
and Caribbean; Europe; Sub-Saharan Africa; Middle East and North Africa; Central and
South Asia; and Asia Pacific and Oceania. Id. art. 1, § 1.4.1.
287. Id. art. 1, § 3.1.3.
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subject-matter experts” to be populated by the Board.288 Before deliberation,
case files will ultimately contain the statement of the user who submitted the
case, a case history from Facebook, a policy rationale from Facebook, clarifying
information from Facebook if requested by the Board, and any additional infor-
mation gathered by the panel.289 All stages of case-file preparation and advocacy
are done in writing, and never in person.
Once the case file is complete and the panel is ready to deliberate, the panel
will convene “privately.”290 All panelists must attend and vote.291 Though con-
sensus is encouraged, it is not required, and all that is needed for a decision is a
majority.292 Once a decision is reached, it must be written up and must include
a specific “determination on the content” as well as the reasoning and explana-
tion for that decision.293 Critically, it can also provide a policy-advisory state-
ment for Facebook to consider.294 Additionally, dissents and concurring opinions
are allowed.295 The panel then sends the written decision to the entire Oversight
Board for review, where it must receive a majority vote in order to be formally
adopted and published.296 In this time, members outside the panel are welcome
to ask questions, and if the decision does not receive majority approval, a new
panel will be convened to rehear the case.297 If a decision is approved, the Board
administration will notify the persons involved and the decision will be pub-
lished on the Board’s website.298
Once a decision has been written, approved, and made public, the shuttle-
cock returns to Facebook for implementation. Under the Bylaws, Facebook must
implement the Board’s decision on the specific piece of content reviewed within
seven days of the “release of the board’s decision.”299 At its own discretion, Face-
book can decide if there is “identical content with parallel context” implied by
the Board’s decision that it can or should also take action on.300 As specified by
288. Id. at art. 1, § 3.1.4.
289. Id. art. 1, § 3.1.5.
290. Id. art. 1, § 3.1.6.
291. Id.
292. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 1, § 4.
293. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 1, § 3.1.6.
294. Id. art. 1, § 3.1.7.
295. Id. art 1, § 3.1.8.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. art. 1, § 3.2.
299. Id. art. 2, § 2.3.1.
300. Id. art. 2, § 2.3.2.
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the Charter, the Board’s policy recommendations are merely advisory.301 Under
the Bylaws, Facebook is required to return a “public response regarding any pol-
icy recommendations and follow-on actions” within thirty days of the Board’s
decision being received.302
b. Facebook Case Submissions
The Bylaws also spell out Facebook’s separate avenue of appeal. Whereas the
Charter only gestured to this separate avenue,303 the Bylaws specify the ways in
which Facebook can ask the Board for review and the extent to which the Board
must listen.304
According to the Bylaws, Facebook can refer cases to the Board for review in
three ways. The first is similar to users’ right to appeal. Facebook can select a
particular case or piece of content and request review. Here, the Board has the
same discretion as with any user-presented case in determining whether to hear
the case.305 The second way leaves the Board with no discretion. In “exceptional”
circumstances that might “result in urgent real-world consequences,” the Board
must hear Facebook’s request automatically and in an expedited fashion, which
is deemed to be no more than thirty days.306 Facebook is then bound by the
Board’s decision.307 Finally, separate from any specific case, Facebook can simply
request policy guidance from the Board, which the Board has discretion to accept
or reject.308 If the Board does issue a policy recommendation, it is only advi-
sory.309
c. Transparency and Amendment
Finally, the Bylaws also speak to transparency and amendment. These pro-
visions are significant because transparency allows the Board to leverage the
weight of public opinion against Facebook and because amendment procedures
speak to who truly controls the documents that convey power to the Board.
301. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 4.
302. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 2, § 2.3.2.
303. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 3, § 7.
304. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 2, § 2.1.
305. Id. art. 2, § 2.1.1.
306. Id. art. 2, § 2.1.2.
307. Id.
308. Id. art. 2, § 2.1.3.
309. Id.
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The Bylaws lay out a number of ways in which the Board, the Trust, and
Facebook seek to be transparent. For instance, the Bylaws commit the Board to
making all case decisions publicly available and archiving them in a database.310
The Board must also publish an Annual Report with metrics on the number and
type of cases reviewed, case submissions by region, and a report on the timeliness
of decisions.311 However, the Bylaws do not specify if the Board’s transparency
reports must include Facebook’s specific case requests or requests for expedited
review.312
When it comes to amending the Bylaws, Facebook retains significant power
and the Board has little ability to control change to the rules outside its own
administration. In matters regarding Oversight Board members, administration,
and transparency reports, only a two-thirds majority of the Board is needed to
amend the Bylaws.313 For every other provision, Facebook must approve all
changes.314 This means, for instance, that the Bylaws’ promise to expand the
Board’s scope of review in the future can only be fulfilled through an amendment
to which Facebook agrees.315
i i i . a new private-public partnership to govern online
speech
In early interviews discussing the body that would become the Oversight
Board, Zuckerberg stated that it should “make the final judgment call on what
should be acceptable speech in a community that reflects the social norms and values
of people all around the world.”316 This vision is not just lofty; it is impossible.
Norms and values develop in and come to define particular communities.317 Fa-
cebook may wish to have one set of Community Standards that would satisfy all
of its users. But a universal community with a universal set of norms underlying
310. Id. art. 2, § 2.3.2.
311. Id.
312. Cf. id. art. 1, § 4.1 (explicitly stating that policy requests and recommendations be public after
the advice of the Oversight Board is received). Compare id. art. 1, § 4.1, with id. art. 2, § 2.
313. Id. art. 5.
314. Id.
315. Id. art. 3, §§ 1.1-1.2 (describing future appealable items, including pages, profiles, groups,
events, advertising, and content reviewed by Facebook but “ultimately allowed to remain on
the platform”).
316. Klein, supra note 15 (emphasis added).
317. See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law
Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 963-64 (1989).
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those standards does not exist at the global level. And if such a global community
of users were to come into existence, it would not be through Facebook reflecting
“the social norms and values of people all around the world” in its rules but ra-
ther by Facebook projecting its own set of rules and values onto users.
Facebook’s projected rules and values are not neutral. For example, Facebook
has a very vocal predisposition to and commitment to freedom of expression.318
This is also reflected in its Values, which prioritize voice over concerns of safety,
privacy, dignity, and authenticity.319 Facebook’s removal of hate speech, harass-
ment, and bullying, all of which would be permissive in a First Amendment
framework, mark concessions to limiting unfettered expression.320 Moreover,
Facebook’s categorization of content cannot draw on universal categories because
no such consensus exists. Hate speech to a Spaniard might be political free ex-
pression to a New Yorker. Obscenity to a Canadian might be art to a Korean.
Fake news to an Australian might be satire to a Brazilian.
The rules that Facebook imposes on its users are thus frequently in conflict
with the norms and expectations of its users. The Board might mitigate such
conflict to some extent. Through policy recommendations, it can surface disa-
greements and suggest changes to the Community Standards. However, the
Board’s idealized primary role is to simply apply rather than change Facebook’s
Values and Community Standards.
This Part explores how the Board can best serve the interests of Facebook’s
global users. Section III.A focuses on defining what exactly the Board is by com-
paring it to existing structures that are similar in process, kind, and purpose.
Section III.B assesses the Board’s significance to global users and suggests ways
in which the Board can grow and improve to best meet users’ needs. Finally,
Section III.C looks at the Board’s long-term impact on industry standards, gov-
ernment, and global online speech. The language of the Charter was left inten-
318. See Tony Romm, Zuckerberg: Standing for Voice and Free Expression, WASH. POST (Oct. 17,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/10/17/zuckerberg-standing
-voice-free-expression [https://perma.cc/25XT-DE4E] (publishing a Facebook-provided text
of a speech by Mark Zuckerberg at Georgetown University).
319. Bickert, supra note 7; Community Standards: Introduction, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/communitystandards [https://perma.cc/7PR2-AYDD] (outlining Face-
book’s Values) [hereinafter Facebook Values].
320. Compare Jillian C. York, A Complete Guide to All the Things Facebook Censors Most, QUARTZ
(June 29, 2016), https://qz.com/719905/a-complete-guide-to-all-the-things-facebook
-censors-hate-most [https://perma.cc/5RAS-GS2P], with Daphne Leprince-Ringuet, Face-
book’s Approach to Content Moderation Slammed by EU Commissioners, ZDNET (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebooks-approach-to-content-moderation-slammed-by
-eu-commissioners [https://perma.cc/439Y-VEFC].
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tionally vague in order to allow other platforms to adopt this structure and lan-
guage for their own use. Whether this ushers in a new era of private-public gov-
ernance and industry collaboration or a standardization that stifles diversity
among platforms and threatens to censor speech remains unclear.
A. What Is the Board? Adjudication and Due Process
Currently, Facebook’s governance of users’ speech is an unchecked system. It
is the kind of arbitrary power that, unrestrained, can trample individual
rights.321 This Section focuses on the analogy between the Board and a court to
contextualize and understand the Board and to identify ways in which Face-
book’s governance might be effectively restrained by an external adjudicator.322
Specifically, it focuses on courts bound by a constitution to protect individual
rights.323
The analogy to courts is valuable, but also imperfect. Compared to U.S. fed-
eral courts, the Board’s ability to select cases and its jurisdictional power of final
authority are similar to that of the U.S. Supreme Court. The use of five-person
panels that decide by majority is akin to a circuit court, though the Board’s en
banc approval of a decision is not required by a circuit court. Like a trial court,
the Board—primarily through its administrative staff—also researches and
builds cases around facts. And as with courts, parties—the appealing user and
Facebook itself—submit written arguments. The Board’s limited jurisdictional
scope renders it similar to a court of special or exclusive jurisdiction. Specifically,
321. See J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 207 (1955); JOHN
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 359, 398 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690).
322. Similarly, DeNardis insists that we should ask what the “most effective” and ideal form of
internet governance would be in a given context, and make that form as robust and rights
enhancing as possible. LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 226
(2014).
323. See Rolf H. Weber & Shawn Gunnarson, A Constitutional Solution for Internet Governance, 14
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 47 (2012). Imagining the Oversight Board as a court is to invite
debate. This comparison is sometimes problematic for those who think of courts in formal
terms as an arm of traditional nation-state government and those who see them as a process in
governance. The Oversight Board is operating in the latter sense, adjudicating individual
claims made on a private transnational platform, but it falls short of formal definitions as a
court or legal system. Ultimately, it is unclear whether saying the Board is a court or court-like
matters. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 223-24 (2011) (describing “degrees of legality” in that
“legality itself is not a binary property but also comes in degrees” through analogy to the
United States Golf Association (USGA) and concluding that “[t]he best we can say about the
USGA, therefore, is that it is like a legal system in some senses, but not in others, and leave it
at that”).
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it (combined with the Board’s limited transparency) suggests a comparison to
administrative courts like the Social Security Administrative Court or the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Compared to other adjudication models, the Board has a similar vision for
global internet adjudication as ICANN’s Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Res-
olution Policy, which sets forth a procedure for resolving domain-name disputes
between registrars and customers.324 And while borrowing rhetoric and proce-
dure from public courts, the Board is at its core a private, independent arbitration
system built by Facebook.325
Using the analogy of courts bound by a constitution to protect individual
rights, this Section evaluates the substantive and procedural protections that the
founding documents provide for users, and the extent to which the documents
give the Board independence.
1. Fundamental Rights
The analogy to a constitution that guarantees substantive and procedural
rights through review by an independent judiciary is crucial for understanding
the founding documents that create the Board. The Charter invokes this analogy
most explicitly; it was envisioned, drafted, and described as a constitutional doc-
ument. But all of the founding documents inform the rights of users, the Board,
and Facebook.
When it comes to the substantive guarantees for users, the Charter’s Intro-
duction states that “[f]reedom of expression is a fundamental human right.”326
But it does not expressly guarantee that right for users. Instead, it contemplates
324. See generally AnneMarie Bridy, Notice and Takedown in the Domain Name System: ICANN’s Am-
bivalent Drift into Online Content Regulation, 74 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1345 (2017) (discussing
how ICANN enforces intellectual-property rights by adjudicating disputes over “domain
names containing trademarked words and phrases”).
325. Attribution for this analogy to alternative dispute resolution goes to Jeff Gary. Unlike ADR,
however, the Board does not foreclose litigation outside of Facebook within actual court sys-
tems in the way many ADR agreements do, and it does not address anything other than eq-
uitable remedies. See George Applebey, What Is Alternative Dispute Resolution?, 15
HOLDSWORTH L. REV. 20, 32 (1991). Moreover, unlike ADR’s guarantee of a procedure, the
Board has discretion over whether to hear a case. See Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201,
art. 1, § 3.1.2.
326. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, at Introduction.
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balancing the right of expression with “authenticity, safety, privacy, and dig-
nity.”327 This formulation invokes Facebook’s Values328 and also the preamble to
Facebook’s Community Standards, which states: “The goal of our Community
Standards has always been to create a place for expression and give people a
voice. This has not and will not change.”329 Though this is a strong statement of
company commitment to the principle of free expression, it too is not a promise of
rights to users. Nor does the preamble guarantee authenticity, safety, privacy, or
dignity to users as substantive rights. Its language remains vague and noncom-
mittal: “We want to make sure the content people are seeing is authentic”; “We
are committed to making Facebook a safe place”; “We are committed to protect-
ing personal privacy and information”; and “We believe that all people are equal
in dignity and rights.”330 Other founding documents, too, nowhere provide for
users’ substantive rights as a constitution would.
The absence of such guarantees is important to understanding what the
Board is and can be for users. First, it makes clear that the limitation on Face-
book’s “arbitrary will” through the Board will not come from reviewing viola-
tions of individual users’ rights but from reviewing Facebook’s promise to up-
hold general principles.331 Second, Facebook’s commitments are in large part
still located in documents—like Facebook’s Values and Community Standards—
that are amendable solely at Facebook’s discretion. Finally, though the Charter
and Bylaws do not create substantive rights for users, they do articulate (albeit
vaguely) Facebook’s promises to users on five critical concerns around online
speech and instruct the Board to also “pay particular attention to the impact of
removing content in light of human rights norms protecting free expression.”332
Though far from a broad or robust adoption of human rights, this is better than
nothing, especially if the Board creates a meaningful method for users to enforce
such rights.
Creating a means for users to seek redress when they find that their “voice”
has been silenced should be the Board’s core purpose. The Charter states that
“[t]he purpose of the board is to protect free expression by making principled,
independent decisions about important pieces of content and by issuing policy
327. Id.
328. Facebook Values, supra note 319.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. It is unclear what practical difference this distinction will make for users’ rights—whether
Facebook’s formulation will result in speech decisions that are “better” or “worse” than a sys-
tem like that of the United States, which takes the individual-rights approach.
332. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 2, § 2.
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advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies.”333 While the scope of review-
able content is relatively narrow, especially at inception, its authority over Face-
book is direct and clear. The Charter states “Facebook will commit to the board’s
independent oversight on content decisions and the implementation of those de-
cisions.”334 This grant of judicial deference is crucial. But equally crucial for en-
suring users’ effective redress is the Board’s ability to provide meaningful due
process through transparency and independence.335
2. Transparency
Transparency is a prerequisite of due process because if a legal system’s rules
and processes are opaque, citizens can neither avail themselves of the process,
nor reliably know if they have violated a rule.336 To allow for due process, citizens
need (1) notice of what the rule is, (2) notice that they have allegedly violated
the rule, (3) notice that a procedural system exists for review of the alleged vio-
lation, (4) notice of what that procedural system entails, and (5) notice of the
ultimate decision reached. In most of these respects, Facebook and the Board
provide a robust level of transparency. Since spring of 2018, Facebook has made
333. Id. at Introduction.
334. Id. art. 5, § 3.
335. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has “stated that the core rights of due process are notice
and hearing.” Martin Redish & Lawrence Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 475-76 (1986) (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). In a technological capacity, these rights have also been brilliantly con-
templated early on by Danielle Keats Citron in Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1249 (2008), which argued that government administrative agencies’ implementation
of technology should be subjected to due process; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale,
The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2014), which
resolved that due process is necessary in providing automated credit scores; and Kate Craw-
ford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy
Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 93 (2014), which addressed due process in the context of predictive
privacy analytics.
336. Redish & Marshall, supra note 335, at 485 (quoting LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39
(1969) (“Certainly there can be no rational ground for asserting that a man can have a moral
obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him.”)). But see David
Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 156 (2018) (analyzing and discussing
private corporations’ use of transparency to access valuable information); Lawrence Lessig,
Against Transparency, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2009), https://newrepublic.com/article/70097
/against-transparency [https://perma.cc/QXX4-SBK9] (discussing the drawbacks of trans-
parency in government for individual privacy and institutional legitimacy).
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its Community Standards and content policy public.337 This allows users to see
how the rules are enforced against them, even if there is currently no way to
independently verify if the public-facing Community Standards are in fact the
ones enforced on users.338 Moreover, significant deliberation went into creating
the Board and its rules during the Global Consultancy. Regarding the second
notice requirement, Facebook provides users with both notice of rule violation
and appeal. Moreover, the founding documents transparently communicate the
structure and procedures of the Board and the Trust. Once the user has appealed
to the Board, the Bylaws provide for notice when the appeal is accepted for re-
view and when a decision has been reached on the case.339 Perhaps most cru-
cially, the Charter instructs panel determinations to include the final directive on
the content along with “a corresponding plain language explanation of the
board’s rationale.”340 These decisions will be publicly posted on the Board’s web-
site, which will operate in eighteen languages.341 Finally, the Bylaws also instruct
the Board to publish annual reports on the number and type of cases and the
timeliness of Facebook’s implementation and response on policy advisory state-
ments.342 This amounts to significantly more transparency around procedure
than Facebook had provided before.
Despite these advances, however, some areas of the Board’s process remain
opaque. While the members will be public, the individual members on a given
panel will serve anonymously. Furthermore, while the Case Selection committee
“will document its selection criteria, as well as the volume and types of cases . . .
the board has selected for review” and publish them in annual reports, the actual
process will remain cloaked.343
337. Facebook has made a number of other significant moves toward transparency around content
moderation—most significantly, the tabulation and publication of quarterly transparency re-
ports around content removal, appeals, and restoration site-wide, and the creation of the Pub-
lic Policy Forum. Bickert, supra note 14. While these are massive efforts, they still have limi-
tations. The Transparency Report, for instance, does not make it particularly easy to find the
actual numbers and percentages of removals, appeals, and restoration. The Public Policy Fo-
rum, while publishing reports and letting in academic observers, is still generally a closed
system private to Facebook.
338. Ideally, this will be a problem that the Oversight Board is built to address.
339. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 1, § 3.
340. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 3, § 4.
341. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 1, §4.
342. Id.
343. Id. art. 1, § 2.1.3. This is not dissimilar to other similar systems of case selection. See, e.g., Sonja
R. West, The Supreme Court’s Limited Public Forum, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 572 (2017)
(describing the complicated semipublic sphere of the Supreme Court).
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3. Independence
In addition to transparency, due process also requires “the participation of
an independent adjudicator.”344 This Section will assess the extent to which the
founding documents establish the independence of the Board by using a three-
part framework: (1) jurisdictional independence, (2) intellectual independence,
and (3) financial independence.
a. Jurisdictional Independence
Jurisdictional independence describes the Board’s powers and obligations to
others and its authority to govern itself. The Board’s authority is predicated on
its creation by the Oversight Board LLC, which in turn derives authority from
the Oversight Board Trust. The Trust Agreement and the Oversight Board LLC
Agreement, together with the Charter and the Bylaws, define the authority, lim-
itations, and relationships of each entity as well as basic procedures for their in-
teraction.
Until the Board’s creation, Facebook had exclusive control over the jurisdic-
tion of its platform—like a territorial sovereign.345 But the very concept of the
Board, which contemplates an independent entity with binding control within
the jurisdiction of Facebook, requires Facebook to convey a portion of its author-
ity to another entity with limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Trust Agreement
“relinquishes [Facebook’s] authority over the Trust,” with the “goal to ensure the
proper administration and structure” to allow the Board to “render its independ-
ent judgment.”346 In order to ensure the establishment of the Board within this
new jurisdiction, the Trust agreement tethers the purpose of the Trust to “the
creation, funding, management, and oversight of a structure that will permit and
protect the operation of an Oversight Board,” and also mandates the creation of
the Oversight Board LLC.347 Facebook’s delegation of authority to the Trust is
far from absolute. Facebook “has relinquished its authority over the Trust except
with respect to key provisions stated herein and under exceptional circumstances.”348
Importantly, this clause does not specifically define which key provisions are lim-
iting the Trust’s authority.
344. Redish & Marshall, supra note 335, at 475.
345. This is limited of course by its obligations under the laws of the nation-states in which it
operates.
346. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, § 2.2.
347. Id. §§ 2.1, 2.3.
348. Id. § 2.2 (emphasis added).
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In regard to the “business and affairs” of the Oversight Board LLC, the Trust
has “sole and absolute discretion.”349 This includes specific administrative pow-
ers, such as the ability to enter into Board member contracts and service agree-
ments, remove and appoint members and staff, issue payment and compensa-
tion, and provide office and research expenses.350 The Trust and the LLC each
have administrative representatives who facilitate requests from the Board and
disbursements from the Trust, respectively. For the Trust, this is the Director of
the LLC Administration, who is appointed by the Corporate Manager.351 For the
LLC, it is the Director of the Oversight Board, who is appointed by the Individ-
ual Managers.352 Critically, in regards to these administrative financial and legal
powers, the Agreements have no mention of Facebook.353 At least in regard to
administrative matters and operation, the Board and Trust largely self-govern.
The majority of the powers granted to the Trust can only be exercised if a
request is made from the Oversight Board Director, but there are some im-
portant exceptions. The most significant of these is the power of the Trustees to
form “one or more companies for the purpose of effectuating the Purpose of this
Trust.”354 “Company” is defined broadly as “any corporate body (of whatsoever
kind), partnership, limited liability company, foundation, organization.”355 This
is a significant power that could allow the Trust, for instance, to create a legisla-
tive body to provide more direct user representation and perhaps issue new con-
tent-moderation rules. However, exercising this power requires Facebook’s con-
sent.356 Moreover, it is unclear how this would be initiated as it requires no
request by the Board or LLC for execution. It is therefore uncertain whether the
Board, which is the entity most likely to want such a legislative body, even has
the power to request it.
Once the Board is created, Facebook must also expressly delegate power to
the Board itself, not just the Trust. The Charter and the Bylaws state that
[the] board’s resolutions of each case will be binding and Facebook will
implement it promptly . . . . When a decision includes policy guidance or
349. Oversight Board LLC Agreement, supra note 250, § 5.1.
350. Id. § 5.3; see Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, § 4.10-4.11.
351. Oversight Board LLC Agreement, supra note 250, § 5.2(b)(ii).
352. Id. § 5.2(b)(i).
353. This is not true for the financial management of the Trust Estate or the ability to amend
founding documents, to be explained infra.
354. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, § 4.6.
355. Id. § 10.1.6.
356. Id. § 4.6.
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a policy advisory opinion, Facebook will take further action by analyz-
ing . . . [and] considering it . . . and transparently communicating about
actions taken as a result [within thirty days].357
The Charter also establishes the Board’s obligations to Facebook: to review con-
tent appeals brought by users, or by Facebook, and issue “reasoned, public deci-
sions . . . [and] provide advisory opinions on Facebook’s content policies.”358
The Board’s unilateral authority to order Facebook to enforce an equitable rem-
edy makes it seem to have authority akin to that of a constitutional court. Like
the government in such a system, Facebook is always the defendant, and the
court adjudicates its adherence to the value of free expression.
But just as with Facebook’s creation of the Trust, the mere granting of some
limited authority tells us little about how the Board can wield it. The strength of
the Board’s authority will be primarily dictated by the scope of material that Fa-
cebook allows the Board to review and users to appeal. Here, as we saw, the
Charter and Bylaws set different expectations. Unlike the Charter’s commitment
to a broad scope, the Bylaws designate only individual pieces of content like
posts, photos, videos, and comments that have been removed by Facebook as
initially eligible for appeal.359 Moreover, in order to exercise the right to appeal,
the user must “have an active Facebook or Instagram account.”360 Other Face-
book services—WhatsApp, Messenger, Instagram Direct, and Oculus—are ex-
plicitly excluded.361 The Bylaws add that “[i]n the future, people will have the
opportunity to request the board’s review” for content reviewed by Facebook
“and ultimately allowed to remain on the platform.”362 But it is unclear how this
promise of a broader scope in the future can be enforced. It appears that such an
initiative would have to be considered through amendment to the Bylaws. Here,
neither the Board, nor the Trust, nor users appear to have significant recourse.
Instead, the Bylaws give only Facebook the authority to amend the relevant sec-
tion “after consulting with the board and the trustees.”363 Thus, although much
content will be available for review, the Bylaws and their process of amendment
357. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 1, § 2.3.2; Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185,
art. 4.
358. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 5, § 1.
359. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 3, § 1.1.
360. Id. art. 2, § 1.1.2.
361. Id. art. 2, § 1.2.1.
362. Id. art. 3, § 1.1.2.
363. Id. art. 5, § 1.
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place significant and meaningful limits on the Board’s ability to self-govern and
on its overall jurisdictional independence.
b. Intellectual Independence
A critical piece of establishing the independence of an adjudicatory body is
ensuring that members are without, or are willing to set aside, personal bias on
matters before them.364 Intellectual independence refers to the procedural af-
fordances made to a body to accomplish this. It is characterized by a body’s free-
dom from external control when making decisions and its ability to avoid bias
through such procedures as the selection and removal of members.
With the exception of the inaugural member-selection process, the Board’s
“Membership Committee” has “sole responsibility” over the recruitment, inter-
view, and selection of new members.365 The only method of outside input is a
public portal through which members of the public, Facebook, and Board mem-
bers can submit candidate recommendations.366 As feedback from the Global
Consultancy had urged,367 any current or former employee of Facebook, and any
person engaged in litigation with Facebook, is disqualified from candidacy to
avoid conflicts of interest.368 If candidates are successfully screened and inter-
viewed by the Committee, their appointment is presented to the full Board for
review, where it requires a majority vote.369 The Bylaws seem to also give Trus-
tees some oversight authority, instructing them that the appointment of new
members should ensure “that the board maintains geographic balance.”370 Feed-
back from the Global Consultancy expressed strong concern about the intellec-
tual independence of the Board due to Facebook’s role in the initial selection pro-
cess. 371 But although the selection of the initial Board included Facebook,
Facebook’s exclusion from the process going forward, the disqualification of cur-
rent or former employees from candidacy, and the clear procedural affordances
to the Board and Trust suggest that they will be able to develop and maintain
intellectual independence in the long-term.
364. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 335, at 500-02.
365. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 1, § 1.2.2.
366. Id.
367. Facebook Consultancy Report, supra note 172, at 20-21.
368. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, at app. A..
369. Id. art. § 1.2.2.
370. Id. art. 4, § 2.1.1.
371. Facebook Consultancy Report, supra note 172, at 17-19.
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Ensuring the Board’s intellectual independence also requires giving it signif-
icant control over the ability to remove members. Feedback from the Global
Consultancy stressed the need to empower the Board in this regard and to define
what would qualify as a violation of the terms of appointment.372 The founding
documents implement this feedback. They vest formal removal power of Board
members in the Trust.373 The Trust can receive removal requests from “the
board, the director, or the public,” a list from which Facebook is notably ab-
sent.374 But it is unclear which party, upon notice of an alleged violation, is re-
sponsible for investigating the claims. On the one hand, the Bylaws give the
Trust the ability to “receive, verify, and act upon requests to remove members
based on violations of the code of conduct.”375 On the other hand, they direct
that removals “require a two-thirds vote of the board . . . subject to approval of
the Trustees.”376 Regardless, the founding documents are clear that a member
may be removed before the end of a term only for violations of the Code of Con-
duct, and Trustees “may not remove a member due to content decisions they
have made.”377 The Code of Conduct, published with the Bylaws, “sets forth the
rules and guidelines that govern the personal and professional conduct for all
board members . . . and staff of the Oversight Board.”378 It also recommends a
method of internal reporting of suspected misconduct for Board members or
staff.379 Thus, the removal of members lies entirely with the Board and Trust,
and not with Facebook.
Finally, the Board must be intellectually independent of Facebook not only
in its control over who is deliberating through appointments and removals but
also in its ability to decide what it deliberates on. Within its jurisdiction, that is,
the Board must be able to review, research, and select cases for deliberation with-
out interference from Facebook. For user appeals, a “Case Selection” committee
is empowered to set and apply criteria for prioritizing cases. A majority of the
372. Id. at 21.
373. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 4, § 2.1.3.
374. Id. art. 4, § 2.1.2.
375. Id.
376. Id. art. 1, § 1.1.2. It might be of note that this provision is found with the “Membership Com-
mittee” section of the Oversight Board section of the Bylaws.
377. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 1, § 8.
378. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, at Code of Conduct.
379. Id. at Code of Conduct, art. 11 (”Members and staff must immediately report violations or
suspected violations of this code of conduct to the director. . . . In the case of a violation in-
volving the director, it should be reported to the trustees.”).
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Committee must agree for a case to go to panel review.380 Were this the only
means of the Board reviewing cases, it would be an entirely independent process.
But it is not. As we saw, Facebook also has power to seek review from the Board
through “Special Procedures.”381 The Charter gives Facebook authority “in ex-
ceptional circumstances” to “send cases to the board for an automatic and expe-
dited review, which the board will accept and review as quickly as possible.”382
Facebook also has the ability to “request” “advisory” “policy guidance” from the
Board.383
The effect of these provisions on the Board’s intellectual independence is
hard to predict. Focusing on the Board’s role as an external appeals body for us-
ers, Facebook’s special powers may have no bearing on the Board’s intellectual
independence. However, Facebook could co-opt the time, energy, and resources
of the Board in pursuit of its own issues and at the expense of the Board’s man-
date to consider users’ appeals. Whether Facebook will use its special powers in
these ways remains to be seen. But on the whole, the founding documents ensure
a robust level of intellectual independence.
c. Financial Independence
Financial independence is another key component of an adjudicative body’s
independence. The most central worry regarding the Board’s financial independ-
ence derives from the fact that Facebook provides all of the Board’s funding. If
members’ compensation comes from the very entity that they are supposed to be
critically reviewing, there is a strong conflict of interest. Members could easily
feel obligated to provide decisions supportive of Facebook, in order to ensure
their continuation on the Board. This is the central reason the Trust was created.
Through the Trust Agreement, the Trust legally accepts the “Initial Trust Es-
tate”—a gift of $130 million—from Facebook. 384 This gift is irrevocable.385 The
380. Id. art. 1, § 3.1.3.
381. See Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 3, § 7.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, § 1.2; Todd Spangler, Facebook Pledges $130
Million to Fund Content Oversight Board as It Hits Delays, VARIETY (Dec. 12, 2019), https://
variety.com/2019/digital/news/facebook-130-million-fund-content-oversight-board
-1203434228 [https://perma.cc/XAJ5-MWX8].
385. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, §§ 1.4, 1.6. It is worth noting that, at its in-
ception, the Trust Estate is more of a gift than an endowment. The distinction relates to who
controls the management of the investment of the Estate, which at the outset is managed by
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purpose of the Trust is to create, fund, manage, and oversee the “structure that
will permit and protect the operation of an Oversight Board.”386 This gives Trus-
tees the power to set up the LLC and provide it with funds for Board member
and staff compensation, expenses, and other financial obligations.387 In addition
to structurally isolating the Board from financial conflicts of interest, the Trust
Agreement also establishes protections to guard against self-dealing by the Trus-
tees.388 These safeguards, together with the irrevocable grant of funding and cre-
ation of the Trust to administer those funds, give the Board meaningful financial
independence.389
B. What Does the Board Mean for Global Users?
Having discussed the nature of the Oversight Board, this Section considers
how the Board, as a system of adjudication, will work for users. Predictions of
the Board’s potential for users can be roughly categorized into three camps—
corresponding to different groups of critics: pessimists, realists, and opti-
mists.390
the Corporate Trustee. Significantly, the Trust Agreement describes how the Trustees gain con-
trol of the investment over time through the creation of an Investment Committee. Id. §§ 4.1,
8.
386. Id. § 2.1.
387. Oversight Board LLC Agreement, supra note 250, § 5.3.
388. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, §§ 3.4, 5, 6.2, 6.6-.7, 6.12.
389. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 335, at 494-500 (describing how such insulation can be
created for judges through tenure and salary protections).
390. See Klonick, supra note 9, at 1613-14 and accompanying footnotes. The opinions expressed in
this Section come from feedback received in presenting this project at the Fordham Interna-
tional Law Journal Symposium, Fordham University School of Law (Oct. 4, 2019); Faculty
Talk, Loyola Law School, Loyola Marymount University (Oct. 30, 2019); Technology Collo-
quium, New York University School of Law (Nov. 4, 2019); Tech & Regulations Roundtable,
Scalia Law School, George Mason University (Nov. 8, 2019); First Amendment & Technology,
Kline School of Law, Drexel University (Nov. 14, 2019); Program on IP & Technology
Law Lecture, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 20, 2019); Harmful Online Activity & Private
Law Conference, University of Haifa (Dec. 5, 2019); Oversight Board Paper Workshop, Data
& Society (Dec. 12, 2019); Oversight Board Paper Workshop, Hans-Bredow-Institut, Univer-
sity of Hamburg (Jan. 6, 2020); The Facebook Oversight Board, London School of Economics
(Jan. 8, 2020); Ohio State Technology Law Journal Symposium, Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law (Jan. 17, 2020); Faculty Talk, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Uni-
versity (Feb. 7, 2020); Tech Law & Policy Colloquium: Julie Cohen, Georgetown University
Law Center (Feb. 20, 2020); Digital Life Seminar: The Facebook Oversight Board, Cornell
Tech, Cornell University (Feb. 27, 2020). Each of these meetings was held under Chatham
House Rules or off the record and no direct attribution is given to any speaker or location. A
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1. The Pessimists
Critics of the Board worry that it will reduce Facebook’s incentives to accu-
rately moderate content. The existence of the Board, for instance, might lead
Facebook to remove more content because it can now refer frustrated users to
the Board. Or it could have the opposite effect. If the Board proved to be a harsh
critic, Facebook might leave up more reported content in order to remove it from
the Board’s jurisdiction.
From a regulatory perspective, many see Facebook’s creation of the Board as
a display of self-regulation in order to stave off actual government regulation.
The Board might also be a purposeful distraction of public attention away from
more critical technological concerns like algorithmic content management or mi-
crotargeting. Most critically, some see the Board as simply serving Facebook’s
business interests, describing Facebook’s creation of the Board as a co-optation
of principles of due process in order to shield and legitimate its capitalistic en-
terprises.
Perhaps the most common criticism of the Board is that it is a public-rela-
tions mechanism for Facebook to defer responsibility and does not do enough
for users. This criticism goes mostly to the Board’s independence. While the
structure of the Board through the LLC and Trust give it robust financial inde-
pendence from Facebook, its limited subject-matter jurisdiction threatens to un-
dermine its potential impact. Additionally, while the Board’s membership-selec-
tion process will eventually be entirely self-governed, it is unclear when that will
occur. Both the Charter and Bylaws provide for Facebook’s role in choosing the
first cochairs and then working with those cochairs to “form the initial board,”
which “thereafter” will become the sole responsibility of the Membership Com-
mittee.391 But they leave open when exactly the initial Board will have been cre-
ated. The Charter contemplates Facebook’s involvement continuing for the “re-
mainder of the board seats,”392 which is troublingly vague—especially given that
the size of the Board is fluidly defined as “no less than eleven members,” and
when fully staffed “likely to be forty members.”393 Neither the Charter nor By-
number of critiques, hopes, and observations about the Board repeated themselves across dis-
cussions. Accordingly, the ideas expressed in this Section are an anonymized summary that
reflects the discussions, questions, comments, and observations that were gathered through
the outside feedback from these presentations and workshops.
391. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 1, § 1.2.2; Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185,
art. 1, § 8.
392. Oversight Board Charter, supra note 185, art. 1, § 8.
393. Id. art. 2, § 1.
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laws describe an event or time that will signal the end of the initial Board’s crea-
tion. The Governance Team initially envisioned Facebook’s role in member se-
lection to end upon the official announcement of eleven to fifteen Board mem-
bers.394 But the date for that announcement has been delayed and the projected
number of members has changed multiple times.395 In recent conversations, Fa-
cebook officials have projected the Board’s initial size to lie above fifteen and “in
the twenties” and have admitted that Facebook’s lack of involvement after the
announcement “might not happen.”396 Facebook’s prolonged involvement in the
inaugural selection process poses significant long-term risks to the intellectual
independence of the Board.397 Finally, critics have also raised transparency con-
cerns about the initial Board selection and the lack of public deliberations.398
Some of these criticisms can be addressed. For instance, the Board could re-
move the panels’ anonymity and increase transparency and public communica-
tions by amending the Bylaws.399 An amendment to the Charter or Bylaws could
also change the scope of content for the Board’s review. This latter amendment,
394. Interview with Andy Pegram, Member Governance Team, Facebook, in Menlo Park, Cal.
(Oct. 21, 2019).
395. See Zuckerberg, supra note 16 (stating in November 2018 that an independent oversight body
would be created “[i]n the next year”); Telephone Interview with Zoe Darmé, Member, Gov-
ernance Team, Facebook (Apr. 3, 2020) (stating that current projected deadline for announc-
ing Board members is early May 2020, but that the timeline changes daily); Telephone Inter-
view with Carolyn Glanville, Commc’ns Manager, Governance Team, Facebook (Nov. 4,
2019) (providing an update that there would be no announcement of Board members in De-
cember, only an announcement of Trust, LLC documents, human-rights report, and mone-
tary commitment, and that Board members would likely be announced in January 2020); Tel-
ephone Interview with Carolyn Glanville, Commc’ns Manager, Governance Team, Facebook
(Dec. 9, 2019) (providing an update that Board members would likely not be announced until
February, and instead the Bylaws and Oversight Board Administrative Director would be an-
nounced in January); Interview with Carolyn Glanville, Commc’ns Manager, Governance
Team, Facebook, in Menlo Park, Cal. (Feb. 27, 2020) (stating that Board members would
likely not be announced until March or April, and perhaps as late as May 2020).
396. Blue Jeans Interview with Fariba Yassaee, supra note 207 (quoting Fariba Yassaee).
397. See Recommendations for the Facebook Content Review Board, STAN. L. SCH. L. & POL’Y LAB 10-11
(Spring 2019), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Stanford
_Policy_Lab_Recs_for_Facebook_Content_Review_Board__FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6BE-WPFQ] [hereinafter Stanford Law Report].
398. Id. at 10, 33-38.
399. The Board can amend the Bylaws as long as they do not conflict with the Charter. Oversight
Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 5.
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however, depends on Facebook’s consent.400 And the same is true for other crit-
ical decisions, such as the appointment of Trustees.401
Missing from the amendment process is a critical voice: users. While the
founding documents provide users with procedural rights, they do not provide
them with direct accountability mechanisms. The rights of the user are only to
use the system, not to give input on its structure, form, procedures, or underlying
rules and values. Disappointment in the limits of user rights is therefore under-
standable. But it might be premised on an unrealistic expectation of accounta-
bility. While users might expect democratic accountability, a more realistic out-
come is participatory empowerment.402 The creation of the Board supports this
thesis. It originated in Facebook users advocating for an independent appeals
system and Facebook listening. Moreover, the process of creating the Board dur-
ing six months of Global Consultancy likewise empowered users through par-
ticipation.
2. The Realists
Many commenters expressed concern that whether or not the Board was a
good idea, it simply would not work in practice. Their chief concern was scale.403
In the second and third quarters of 2019, 30.8 million pieces of content remained
down even after appeal.404 This equates to approximately 170,000 pieces of con-
tent per day that would be potentially eligible for Board review.405 Even if just
one percent of those cases were appealed, that would still amount to around
1,700 cases a day. This is a daunting number of cases to process by a Selection
Committee that forms a subset of an eleven-to-forty-person Board, even with
staff support. Meaningfully processing the volume of cases submitted will be
challenging—especially given the timeline of ninety days from filing to decision
on appeal.406
400. Id.
401. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, §§ 1.5, 6.2.
402. See Stanford Law Report, supra note 397 at 11.
403. Id. at 19.
404. Community Standards Enforcement Report, supra note 30 (describing the calculation methodol-
ogy—subtracting the total number of pieces of content appealed from the total number of
pieces of content restored).
405. Id. (describing the calculation method, which took the number of pieces that remained down
after appeal and were eligible for Board review and divided it by the number of days in half a
year).
406. Stanford Law Report, supra note 397, at 19-20.
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Additional practical concerns arose with regard to the system’s potential ma-
nipulation, for instance by trolls coordinating to submit identical or similar re-
quests and crashing the submission system. The Board’s commitment to trans-
parency on decisions raises complications as well. The Board will provide
reasoned decisions on the cases it hears and log those decisions in a public data-
base. It will thus operate much like a common-law court, providing people with
application of rules to real-life facts. But how much transparency is required? It
is tempting to suggest that the decision should contain the actual piece of content
reviewed. But if the decision upholds Facebook’s decision to remove the content,
it seems contradictory to post a copy of that very content on the Board’s website.
Such contradictions are not limited to hearing cases but also include amend-
ing the founding documents. For instance, ads are imagined as coming into the
future scope of the Board. But if the only appealable decisions are on content
“removed for violating the Community Standards,” it is very hard to see how this
would ever work in practice for a typical user, whose primary complaint would
likely be that the ad itself violated Community Standards. This means that be-
fore ads can come into the scope of the Board’s review it is likely that the scope
will first have to be expanded to include “content reviewed . . . and ultimately
allowed to remain on the platform.”407
3. The Optimists
Besides raising normative and practical concerns, the Board also holds great
potential for users. At the outset, it gives users more process and ability to be
heard than ever before. Even with its narrow jurisdictional scope, the procedural
right of review by an independent adjudicator with the authority to instruct Fa-
cebook to restore speech is significant for global freedom of expression. It creates
a tool that can be leveraged by users. Groups or organizations that disagree with
Facebook’s Community Standards could organize to submit large numbers of
appeals regarding the same kind of removed content and thus attempt to create
better odds of the Board selecting its case. If the Board selects the case, the sub-
mitting group would have an opportunity to argue not only for reinstatement of
the content but for why the rule is wrong. If successful, the Board might not only
restore the content, but it would ideally recommend that Facebook change the
policy.
By giving users a right to appeal, the Board also tackles two of the most sig-
nificant inequities in the moderation of online speech: Facebook’s lack of trans-
parency around content moderation and inequities in user access to content re-
instatement. This promises to hold Facebook accountable for content-
407. Oversight Board Bylaws, supra note 201, art. 3, § 1.1.2.
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moderation inaccuracies and give users equal access to an equitable remedy. In
so doing, it replaces the historically opaque private system marked by cronyism
and influence. Every day, Facebook removes millions of pieces of content, and
the vast majority of users have no recourse to achieve reinstatement. External
message boards and third-party websites proliferate to answer users’ attempts at
self-help to unlock disabled accounts or reinstate removed content.408 For most
of Facebook’s history, getting your content restored was simply a matter of
knowing the right people. Users who had connections to people inside Facebook
or Instagram, to civil-society members who maintained connections to the com-
pany, or to members of the media who could draw attention to the fact that they
had been censored were the most successful at getting their content restored.
Even the media pushback against Facebook’s censorship was often not a tale of
popular empowerment, but rather an example of real-world power manifesting
itself online. Facebook had removed posts of the “Terror of War” photo thou-
sands of times before that day in September 2016, when the user censored was
influential and politically connected enough for the media to expend coverage.
By providing every user with transparency in appeals, process, and independent
review, the Board takes a small but important step in remedying this inequity.
Finally, the Board might make Facebook better at serving users. The Board’s
decisions and policy recommendations may help Facebook to create policies that
reflect what users want to see. The Board might also improve how Facebook re-
searches, designs, and builds its other products. The Governance Team’s model
of user participation in the process of creating the Board has received great in-
terest company-wide. Beyond Facebook, too, the Board might lead to more
widespread user participation in deciding how to design private systems that
govern our basic human rights.
C. Impact on Industry, Government, and Global Speech
The majority of this Feature has focused on the relationship between four
parties: Facebook, users, the Trust, and the Board. As discussed, the creation of
the Board will likely have both positive and negative effects on these entities, but
it will also have a far broader impact on industry, governments, and global
speech.
408. See, e.g., Facebook Remove My Post Because They Look Like Spam, MPSOCIAL (Aug. 2017),
https://mpsocial.com/t/facebook-remove-my-post-because-they-look-like-spam/23514
[https://perma.cc/C5RE-7B43]; Got Your Facebook Account Disabled?, GETASSIST.NET
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://getassist.net/recover-disabled-locked-suspended-facebook-account
[https://perma.cc/P2ER-KDUX].
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The Trust Agreement in particular gives significant power to Trustees to act
in fulfilling their purpose of supporting the Board. It empowers them, for in-
stance, to form companies—such as the legislative body discussed above.409 Or
they could create a research group of experts on content moderation or an as-
sembly of human-rights experts to advise the Board on decisions. True, Face-
book would need to agree to the creation of such bodies, but the Board could
exert pressure for this to happen. Finally, as will be discussed more below, the
Trust’s power to form companies could allow it to form LLCs for other private
platforms that wish to use the insulation created by the Trust to set up their own
oversight boards.
1. Industry
There are at least five possible ways in which the Board might influence how
online speech platforms adjudicate content.
1. The Board has no impact at all because it fails or is never adopted
outside of Facebook.
2. Platforms replicate the process of creating the Board or design their own
processes (involving user participation) to create adjudicatory bodies.
3. Platforms contribute money to the Trust but, instead of creating their
own boards, they request to use the Facebook Oversight Board to adjudicate
appeals on their own content. In this scenario, the Board would then ei-
ther have to delegate each platform’s appeal review to specific members
or attempt to make all members familiar with all sets of rules and values
and apply the correct set of rules to each appeal.
4. Platforms contribute money to the Trust to set up their own Oversight
Board to adjudicate appeals on content under their own rules and values.
For this to happen, a platform would make an irrevocable grant to the
Trust and relinquish its authority over the Trust; the Trust would then
create an LLC to manage the platform’s Oversight Board.
5. Platforms use the founding documents as models, making slight
changes, and convene their own trusts and boards.
The Board’s industry impact on speech varies greatly among these potential
outcomes. If the Board fails entirely or remains relevant only to Facebook, the
effects will likely be limited and confined to how Facebook regulates its speech.
409. Oversight Board Trust Agreement, supra note 250, § 4.6.
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At the other extreme, platforms may decide to replicate the participatory process
used to create the Oversight Board, draft their own founding documents, and
create their own trust and board. Because this latter path involves user partici-
pation, it has the highest likelihood of achieving legitimacy and accurately re-
flecting the interests of platform users. This method also has the highest likeli-
hood of generating diversity among platforms by opening the possibility of new
forms outside the Facebook model. But unfortunately, this is also the least likely
outcome given the difficulty and expense of such a process, and given the com-
parative ease of simply using existing structures and documents created by Fa-
cebook’s process.
Of the remaining outcomes, the third is the worst for speech. The adminis-
trative and operational complexity of having one Oversight Board applying mul-
tiple sets of platform rules and values would be overwhelming. Moreover, it vests
users’ power of appeal in one industry-wide board. Over time, that board’s de-
cisions might standardize rules across the industry. This would likely reduce di-
versification in markets for different types of speech environments.
The final two outcomes are the best for speech. They involve independent
oversight boards that are specifically employed to adjudicate the appeals of their
platforms. Having distinct oversight boards preserves diversity in industry
speech policies and optimizes opportunities for online free expression.410 Of
these options, platforms using the founding documents as models is preferable
to platforms simply using the Oversight Board Trust because it allows platforms
more control over customizing the structures of the Trust and Board. In the long
term, it could also help produce better content moderation at all levels by creat-
ing a “market of rule sets.” Larger platforms that can afford to fund and create a
board could make their systems available to other firms based on the scale of
their content-moderation needs. In this scenario, small or nascent firms would
then be able to easily and affordably choose which model of speech regulation
they wanted on their platform and employ the corresponding board. The Board’s
founding documents were designed for this very purpose—to allow platforms to
use them easily as a template for their own systems of speech governance.
2. Government
There are at least three possible ways in which governments might react to
the Board:
410. As of this writing, one major global speech platform has already announced its own “advisory
council.” Vanessa Pappas, Introducing the TikTok Content Advisory Council, TIKTOK (Mar.
18, 2020), https://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/introducing-the-tiktok-content-advisory
-council [https://perma.cc/A2Z2-WXD3].
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1. Nation-states ignore the Oversight Board and future platform boards.
2. Nation-states recognize the Oversight Board or boards’ decisions as
precedential authority when public courts adjudicate platform speech is-
sues.
3. Nation-states co-opt the Oversight Board or boards by requiring these
private systems to adjudicate platform speech issues that surface in pub-
lic courts.
The impact of the Oversight Board on governments is expressly limited, in
that the founding documents exclude from appeal any content that is removed
by Facebook in accordance with the law. Governments, however, could have a
potentially strong impact on the Board. This of course would not be true if gov-
ernments and courts simply ignored the Board and similar private systems. But
that seems unlikely given the current political climate surrounding technology
companies. One possibility, favorable to the Board, is that courts might recog-
nize the Board’s reasoning when the same or a similar content claim is raised in
a legal action. Courts are unlikely to accept the Board’s decision as precedential
or give it comity, but they might consider it persuasive. Such recognition of the
limited and private jurisdiction of the Board might be similar to courts’ recogni-
tion of private alternative dispute resolution. The more problematic outcome
both for global speech and the Board would be if governments were to co-opt
this private system for their own ends. For example, courts might order the
Board to adjudicate and enforce claims of a certain type, similar to the European
Court of Justice’s directive to Google to administer right-to-be-forgotten
claims.411 This would be especially bad for speech if a court decided to also direct
the Board to administer such claims in accordance with the law in the court’s
jurisdiction and apply the decisions to all of Facebook. Recent cases have sug-
gested courts’ ability to use a platform to enforce their jurisdiction extraterrito-
rially, a development that flouts national sovereignty and individual rights.412
411. See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R.
317 (ruling that Google must honor a claimant’s request to “delist” information from its search
engines but acknowledging that the claimant’s right must be balanced against concerns for
access to information, and placing adjudication of that balancing test on a case-by-case basis
in the hands of Google). For a rich discussion of the implications of nation-states using private
companies to adjudicate and administer their rules, see Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Eu-
rope’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 BERKE-
LEY TECH. L.J. 287 (2018).
412. See Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., Judgment, 2019 E.C.R. 821;
Daskal & Klonick, supra note 18 (discussing the written opinion of the Advocate General in
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3. Global Free Expression
The impact of the Oversight Board on global free expression has been ad-
dressed and analyzed throughout this piece. What has been largely unexplored,
however, is the way in which the future of online speech will affect the Board.
As this Feature goes to press, the world is experiencing a global pandemic
seemingly unprecedented in human history.413 Governments have ordered peo-
ple to remain in their homes,414 closed schools,415 banned the assembly of people
in large groups,416 and restricted travel.417 Museums, concert halls, stadiums,
operas, theatres, and even parks are empty.418 Courts have closed and canceled
Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., 2019 E.C.R. 458). For excellent dis-
cussion on this topic, see Jennifer Daskal, Borders and Bits, 71 VAND. L. REV. 179 (2018).
413. See Ronald Bailey, Are We Battling an Unprecedented Pandemic or Panicking at a Computer-Gen-
erated Mirage?, REASON (Mar. 18, 2020), https://reason.com/2020/03/18/are-we-battling-an
-unprecedented-pandemic-or-panicking-at-a-computer-generated-mirage [https://
perma.cc/R35A-DK6Q]; Elizabeth Kolbert, Pandemics and the Shape of Human History, NEW
YORKER (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/06/pandemics
-and-the-shape-of-human-history [https://perma.cc/KB2A-DMEM].
414. Sarah Mervosh et al., See Which States and Cities Have Told Residents to Stay Home, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/coronavirus-stay-at-home
-order.html [https://perma.cc/K8NH-FW4H]; Sonia Sarkar, Coronavirus Quarantine in In-
dia: No Tests, Stained Toilets and Broken Beds Force Some to Flee, S. CHINA MORNING POST
(Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/health-environment/article/3076896
/coronavirus-quarantine-india-unhygienic-facilities [https://perma.cc/ZSM8-GXCB].
415. Map: Coronavirus and School Closures, EDUC. WEEK (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.edweek.org
/ew/section/multimedia/map-coronavirus-and-school-closures.html [https://perma.cc
/5KAK-JWYZ].
416. Katrin Bennhold & Melissa Eddy, Germany Bans Groups of More than 2 to Stop Coronavirus as
Merkel Self-Isolates, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/22
/world/europe/germany-coronavirus-budget.html [https://perma.cc/8Z6Z-NMQ8].
417. Megan Specia, What You Need to Know About Trump’s European Travel Ban, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/world/europe/trump-travel-ban
-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/BQ8Z-2KGF].
418. Coronavirus-Related Closures and Canceled Events in Washington, DC, DESTINATION DC
(Apr. 17, 2020), https://washington.org/dc-information/coronavirus-event-attraction
-information [https://perma.cc/SH95-YMBR]; Robin Pogrebin & Michael Cooper, New
York’s Major Cultural Institutions Close in Response to Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/12/arts/design/met-museum-opera-carnegie-hall
-close-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/35E3-KRC3].
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civil and criminal trials and hearings.419 Shops, cafes, gyms, malls, restaurants,
and bars have closed doors that might never reopen.420
The realities of worldwide mass quarantine have decimated the economy and
stymied government, but perhaps the most devastating and permanent effects
will be social. Around the world, people have been shuttered in their homes for
weeks and months, unable to gather in groups or experience social connection.
Children are separated from parents, teachers are separated from students,
neighbors are separated from each other. The infected, sick, and at-risk are cut
off.
This real-world social isolation has exposed and deepened the essential and
massive power of network communications technology. Individuals’ ability to
connect to each other through the internet and its platforms swiftly became a
basic human right. Instead of litigating the legality of government mandates
denying assembly, people sought out communities online. New Facebook
Groups, Slack channels, and group texts proliferated.421 Universities and grade
schools turned to Zoom, WebEx, and Google Hangouts to hold regular clas-
ses.422 Virtual board meetings, birthdays, dinners, and happy hours were held
online. The sick and dying said goodbye through FaceTime and Skype.423
419. Debra Cassens Weiss, A Slew of Federal and State Courts Suspend Trials or Close for Coronavirus
Threat, ABA J. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/a-slew-of-federal
-and-state-courts-jump-on-the-bandwagon-suspending-trials-for-coronavirus-threat
[https://perma.cc/RXH5-3BGG].
420. Alex Gangitano, Poll: Almost One in Four Small Businesses Are Two Months or Less Away from
Closing Permanently, USA TODAY (Apr. 3, 2020), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying
/business-a-lobbying/490957-poll-one-in-four-small-businesses-are-two-months-or
[https://perma.cc/7ARZ-KDRN].
421. Kara Swisher, Opinion, How Will Tech Help in a Time of Pandemic?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/opinion/coronavirus-tech-facebook.html
[https://perma.cc/7BEX-8XV9].
422. Doug Lederman, Will Shift to Remote Teaching Be Boon or Bane for Online Learning?, INSIDE
HIGHER ED (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2020
/03/18/most-teaching-going-remote-will-help-or-hurt-online-learning [https://perma.cc
/UK9R-EECY].
423. Bill Gardner, Deathbed Goodbyes Should Be Done over Skype, Says New NHS Coronavirus Guid-
ance, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/03/17/exclusive
-deathbed-goodbyes-should-done-skype-says-new-nhs-coronavirus [https://perma.cc
/8DQW-2FER]; Amir Vera, A Woman Got to Say Goodbye to Her Mother over FaceTime Before
She Died Thanks to a Nurse at This Washington Hospital, CNN (Apr. 5, 2020), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/03/30/us/washington-nurse-coronavirus-facetime/index.html
[https://perma.cc/A8FZ-AJRG].
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In the midst of the crisis, Facebook announced it would be suspending most
of its human content moderation globally.424 Unlike the billions of people work-
ing from home, content moderators must work on special screens and be super-
vised to ensure user privacy. In place of human review, Facebook announced it
would do more automated content moderation.425 At a normal time, this decline
in meaningful human content review426 on a prominent speech platform would
raise questions of over- or undercensorship of speech. But in the midst of a global
pandemic with a population never before so reliant on internet platforms, over-
or undercensorship of speech is also a threat to public health.427
The effect of this long-term experiment without human content moderation
remains to be seen. Its greatest threat is not that it gives Facebook plausible jus-
tification to remove human review but that it may groom users to accept this
outcome.428 If a long-term policy in the future were to deny users the right of
human review, the Oversight Board would become more than just an exercise in
user participation in platform governance; it would be a vital procedural element
of protecting users’ right to global free expression.
424. Alex Schultz, Keeping Our Services Stable and Reliable During the COVID-19 Outbreak, FACE-
BOOK NEWSROOM (Mar. 24, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/03/keeping-our-apps
-stable-during-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/672W-8PLN].
425. Kang-Xing Jin, Keeping People Safe and Informed About the Coronavirus, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM
(Apr. 21, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/04/coronavirus/#content-review
[https://perma.cc/4M99-FAXQ] (“[W]ith a reduced and remote workforce, we will now rely
more on our automated systems to detect and remove violating content and disable ac-
counts.”).
426. For an excellent discussion on the right to human decision in the midst of algorithmic adju-
dication, see Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 105 VA. L. REV. 611 (2020) (citing
empirical evidence and international normative arguments for the use of human decision-
makers). For discussion of human decision-making and human dignity, see generally JEREMY
WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012), which describes dig-
nity and its relation to the law; Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements,
in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON
BIOETHICS (2008), which analyzes a capabilities-based theory of dignity for bioethics; and Tal
Zarsky, The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to Examine Efficiency and
Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making, 41 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 118 (2016),
which analyzes fairness issues with algorithmic decision-making.
427. See, e.g., David Harsanyi, Opinion, Facebook Fails the Coronavirus Censorship Test, BOS.
HERALD (Apr. 26, 2020), https://www.bostonherald.com/2020/04/26/facebook-fails-the
-coronavirus-censorship-test [https://perma.cc/S3FB-V7CA].
428. See Bloch-Wehba, supra note 33.
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conclusion
Global events demonstrate that freedom of speech can no longer be separated
into two separate worlds—one online, the other offline. The Oversight Board
marks the first platform-scaled moment of transnational internet adjudication of
online speech. It signifies a step towards empowering users by involving them
in private platform governance and providing them with a modicum of proce-
dural due process.
The pace at which this area of scholarship and technology is changing is re-
markable. Twenty years ago, Facebook did not yet exist; fifteen years ago, it was
a fad website from a college dorm room; ten years ago, it was an emerging em-
pire; today, it connects almost a third of the global population. Similarly, five
years ago, few would have thought it possible that a private corporation would
voluntarily divest itself of part of its power in order to create an independent
oversight body. Like the past events that led to it, the future of the Oversight
Board is impossible to predict, once humans start interpreting and understand-
ing the documents and processes contemplated in this Feature. But even though
the Board’s founding documents have flaws and limitations and leave questions
unanswered, they are a promising new tool for ensuring free speech around the
world.
